Quality of Official Development Assistance

QuODA 2021 Methodology

May 2021

Ian Mitchell, Rachael Calleja, and Sam Hughes

Contents

Introduction

This is the fifth edition of the Center for Global Development's (CGD) efforts to measure the Quality of Official Development Assistance (QuODA).[1] QuODA is a comparative framework that uses quantitative data to allow providers to explore and assess performance relative to peers on multiple dimensions of development quality. The aim of QuODA is to increase the quality of official development assistance (ODA) by assessing and comparing provider performance on provider commitments and other indicators that matter to the effectiveness of development cooperation.

QuODA addresses the question, "How are development cooperation providers doing on commitments that they have made, and indicators that matter, to improving ODA quality?" QuODA does not assess how effective ODA has been; that depends on the combined efforts of both providers and partner countries. It is instead an assessment of providers' efforts to comply with their commitments to dimensions of ODA quality that evidence and experience suggest lead to better development outcomes. With QuODA, we focus only on factors over which development cooperation providers have control.[2]

QuODA builds on and complements other measures of aid quality by directly comparing providers' performance on key indicators of ODA quality, and is the only measure to consistently compare bilateral and multilateral ODA. It brings together measures from various sources, like those from the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), to provide a broad overview of performance. Development is certainly not just about aid, finance, or ODA—while QuODA focusses on the quality of ODA, CGD's Commitment to Development Index takes a much broader view of how policy matters to development and includes components on investment, migration, trade, environment, security, and technology. The CDI also focusses on a broader set of countries including all of the G20, while QuODA is limited to those countries and agencies recording and reporting on ODA.

A new framework for QuODA 2021

Previous editions of QuODA were released by CGD and Brookings Institution in 2010, 2011, and 2014, and by CGD in 2018 (using latest data available from 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2016, respectively).[3] Each edition of QuODA has updated aspects of the methodology; a full list of the changes is available in the 2018 QuODA methodology, or in methodology notes for the prior QuODA editions.

Following the release of the 2018 QuODA, CGD undertook a substantive and consultative review of the QuODA indicators to account for new evidence and thinking around best practices in ODA quality. This included a review of the evidence on aid effectiveness; a workshop of development agencies in June 2019; discussions with policy officials and experts on development effectiveness; an event at the World Bank/ IMF Autumn Meetings in 2019;[4] a series of blogs setting out new indicators (for example on evaluation[5] and aid allocation[6]); and a peer-reviewed working paper published in January 2020.[7] The framework and indicators presented in the 2021 edition of the QuODA represent the results of this process.[8]

---

[1] The indicators included in this edition were the result of in-depth analysis conducted by Caitlin McKee, Catherine Blampied, Ian Mitchell and Andrew Rogerson, as outlined in McKee et al. (2020).
[2] Text in this section is from the QuODA Second Edition report by Birdsall et al. (2011).
[3] Authors of the previous editions of QuODA were Homi Kharas of Brooking Institution and colleagues at the Center for Global Development Nancy Birdsall and Rita Perakis, and most recently, Caitlin McKee.
[4] See: https://www.cgdev.org/event/do-we-still-care-about-principles-and-measures-aid-effectiveness
[5] Blampied et al. (2020)
[6] Mitchell and Hughes (2020)
[7] See McKee et al. (2020) for more on the findings of the review.
[8] Annexes 1 and 2 include a full list of changes to the QuODA indicators since the prior edition.

The 2021 QuODA framework consists of 17 indicators that are grouped into four broad dimensions:

- **Prioritisation**. This dimension includes indicators that capture key allocation choices made by providers on where, for what purposes, and through which channels ODA is spent. The aim is to proxy the degree to which allocations are targeted to best respond to need and long-term development challenges.
- **Ownership**. Indicators in this dimension examine the degree to which providers work with and through partner countries to promote domestic ownership and use of national systems. Ownership has long been considered a core tenet of the development effectiveness agenda and remains a key principle of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC).
- **Transparency & untying**. This dimension measures the degree to which providers publish information on ODA activities in a timely and comprehensive way. Transparency remains a key principle of the development effectiveness agenda under GPEDC and is recognised for forming the basis of mutual accountability. It also measures the extent to which providers "tie" procurement to their own contractors.
- **Evaluation**. Indicators in this dimension assess the quality of providers' learning and evaluation systems. The aim is to identify systems and practices that are designed both to capture evidence from development programming and to use this data to inform future decision-making.

The indicators included in this edition of the QuODA are summarized in Table 1, below.

Table 1. QuODA 2021 indicators

Prioritisation	Ownership	Transparency & untying	Evaluation
P1: Aid spent in partner countries	O1: Alignment at objectives level	T1: Aid reported in IATI	E1: Evaluation systems
P2: Poverty focus	O2: Use of country financial systems	T2: Comprehensiveness of data (CRS)	E2: Institutional learning systems
P3: Contributions to under-aided countries	O3: Reliability and predictability	T3: Timeliness (IATI and CRS)	E3: Results-based management systems
P4: Core support to multilaterals	O4: Partner feedback	T4: Untied aid (official)	
P5: Supporting fragile states and global public goods		T5: Untied aid (contracts)	

Taken together, the 2021 QuODA framework provides a summary of providers' efforts to implement best practices in development effectiveness and improve ODA quality. The indicators used are those that development cooperation providers, practitioners, and academics have identified as being important for development effectiveness and quality.

However, **QuODA is not a complete measure of development effectiveness or impact**. The outcomes of development activities often depend on the combination of provider efforts and the performance of partner countries or other executors of development programmes, not just the funding agency. This would require a range of qualitative information that is beyond the scope of our work, but is often contained in evaluations and peer reviews to which each DAC member (and many multilateral agencies) subscribes. We

rank providers according to the average score across the four dimensions on the QuODA web interface, but we also enable the user to adjust the basis of the rankings. The rankings are intended to stimulate debate and to focus attention on development effectiveness. Still, we view **QuODA as a tool for starting a dialogue, not a definitive measure of development quality.**

Part 1. Data and methods

This section outlines the main data and methods we use to compile QuODA 2021, including details on sample selection, key data sources, and how we aggregate dimension-level scores for providers. Part 2 provides more detail on the computation, rationale, and data sources for each indicator.

Sample selection

QuODA 2021 is measured for 49 providers, including 30 bilateral actors (including EU institutions) and 19 multilateral agencies. We selected our sample of providers based on the following logic:

- **Bilateral providers**. Our sample includes all 30 members of the OECD DAC on the basis that DAC members subscribe to the same guidance and standards around ODA, including on effectiveness. As members of the DAC, these providers also consistently report ODA expenditures to the OECD, meaning that there is consistent and granular data across the sample of providers.[9]

- **Multilateral agencies**. We include a sample of 19 multilateral agencies in QuODA 2021. To select multilateral agencies for inclusion in QuODA, we considered two criteria. First, we included any multilateral agency with an average volume of either ODA disbursements or commitments at or above $250 million (excluding humanitarian assistance) between 2017-2019.[10] We exclude humanitarian spending from most indicators on the basis that parts of the development effectiveness agenda most clearly applies to developmental spending and may not be applicable in humanitarian contexts (during an emergency, for instance, it may not be possible or feasible to work through country systems).[11] Moreover, several of our indicators are based on country programmable aid (CPA), which excludes humanitarian spending and it would, therefore, not be possible to capture results for agencies with wholly humanitarian budgets. Practically, this criterion led to the exclusion of four agencies—the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Population Fund, the Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), and the World Food Programme—which fall below the threshold when humanitarian spending is excluded. Additionally, we excluded the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) on the basis that its limited geographic focus would penalize it on several indicators simply due to its mandate.

---

[9] We have not included non-DAC providers in this iteration of the QuODA, however we recognise that Southern providers are significant contributors to the international development system. Some data comparing the quality and quantity of development finance across both DAC and non-DAC is available in Center for Global Development's 2020 Commitment to Development Index.
[10] Using data from the OECD's CRS database, downloaded Feb 2, 2021.
[11] See McKee et al. (2020)

Table 2. Development agencies or provider countries included in QuODA 2021

Development agency or provider country	Gross ODA disbursements 2019 (US millions)	Development agency or provider country	Gross ODA disbursements 2019 (US millions)
African Development Fund	1944	International Development Association	18389
Arab Fund (AFESD)	722	International Labour Organization	281
Asian Development Bank	3205	Ireland	973
Australia	2898	Islamic Development Bank	307
Austria	1237	Italy	4404
Belgium	2220	Japan	18920
Canada	4741	Korea	2652
Climate Investment Funds	67*	Luxembourg	476
Czechia	309	Netherlands	5307
Denmark	2601	New Zealand	555
EU Institutions	18073	Norway	4334
Finland	1152	OPEC Fund for International Development	364
Food and Agriculture Organization	455	Poland	787
France	14544	Portugal	442
Germany	26901	Slovakia	116
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	2081	Slovenia	88
Global Environment Facility	281	Spain	2987
Global Fund	3583	Sweden	5278
Greece	368	Switzerland	3214
Green Climate Fund	257	UNDP	372
Hungary	312	UNICEF	1023
Iceland	61	United Kingdom	19620
IFAD	731	United States	33711
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	1473	World Health Organization	548
Inter-American Development Bank	826		

* CIF told us that they disbursed $423m in 2019. The data from QuODA is drawn primarily from the CRS and the above results for CIF are based on the $67 million identified for 2019 in the CRS database at the time of writing. Prior years' CRS data shows higher disbursement amounts, averaging $250m over 2017 to 2019.

Note: Climate Investment Funds and Islamic Development Bank shows disbursements less than $250 million in 2019. Both are included in the sample because the three-year average of ODA disbursements or commitments (less humanitarian spend) is above $250.

Source: Data for DAC members (including the EU) is sourced from the OECD's DAC 1 table and includes both bilateral and multilateral spending. Data for the multilateral institutions is sourced from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System.

Data types and sources

The 2021 edition of QuODA relies primarily on the following data sources. Unless otherwise stated, all data is from 2019 as the most recent available.

Data sources used for multiple indicators:

- **Creditor Reporting System (CRS).**[12] Several indicators include a measure of bilateral ODA taken from the OECD's CRS database, which provides detailed project level information about aid activities provided by "creditors." Used for seven indicators.
- **Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)**[13] **monitoring data.** GPEDC conducts regular monitoring surveys to assess progress on the principles of effective development cooperation, which were agreed to as part of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.[14] More information on the GPEDC data and indicators is available in GPEDC's Technical Companion and Monitoring Guide. GPEDC monitoring data is used for four indicators.
- **Country Programmable Aid (CPA)**[15] – four indicators use country programmable aid as the flow of interest. CPA is a subset of ODA that is subjected to regular and multiyear programming at the country level and excludes any ODA that does not leave the provider country and that is inherently unpredictable (humanitarian flows, for instance). This data is compiled and published by the OECD.
- **OECD Peer Reviews.** Every four to five years, the OECD DAC conducts an in-depth examination of the development systems and policies of bilateral DAC members. These Peer Reviews are used as the main source for assessing bilateral providers on indicators E1, E2, and E3 in the 2021 QuODA iteration.
- **MOPAN Assessments.** Like the OECD with its Peer Reviews, the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) conducts assessments of dimensions of organizational and development effectiveness of multilateral agencies every four to five years. The MOPAN assessments are used as the main source for assessing multilateral providers on indicators E1, E2, and E3 in the 2021 QuODA iteration.
- **International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI).**[16] IATI is a global initiative that aims to improve the transparency of development spending. Data is reported to IATI by governments, multilateral organizations, civil society, and private foundations on a voluntary basis and is publicly available through the IATI website. IATI data is used for indicators T1 and T3 in the 2021 QuODA iteration.
- **OECD Members' use of the multilateral system**. This dataset is published by the OECD and provides information on contributions made by providers to the multilateral system, either as core contributions or as funding allocated through multilateral agencies. This data was used in indicator P4 and P5.

---

[12] Data downloaded on 30th April 2021
[13] The GPEDC is "a multi-stakeholder platform to advance the effectiveness of development efforts by all stakeholders, and to deliver results that are long-lasting and contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals."
[14] Data availability for GPEDC monitoring surveys: Note that some multilateral agencies—the regional funds—use the data for the development bank they are associated with. This is because funds are not tracked separately, but the assumption that the behaviour of the fund would be comparable to the bank. Asian Development Fund = Asian Development Bank, African Development Fund = African Development Bank, IDA = World Bank.
[15] Data downloaded on 26th April 2021.
[16] Data downloaded on 5th March 2021

Data sources used for single indicators:

- **World Development Indicators** provide the data for GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $), used to assess the poverty-weighting of ODA flows in indicator P2. GDP per capita (Atlas method) and population data was also used to calculate optimal aid allocations in indicator P3.
- **OECD Fragility score**[17] is used to assess the fragility-weighting of ODA flows in indicator P5a. Specifically, we use the first "aggregate principal component," which matches the overall ranking of countries based on average fragility across dimensions. We use data corresponding to the 2020 States of Fragility report, which is the latest available.
- **DAC1** is published by the OECD and provides information on the main aggregates related to development finance, including the split between bilateral and multilateral ODA, per provider. This dataset is used to calculate indicator P4 on core contributions to the multilateral system.
- **OECD Contracts Data** as reported in the *2020 Report on the DAC untying recommendation* is used to calculate indicator T5. Specifically, data is drawn from Table A.9.
- **IDA Country Performance Ratings** are used in indicator P3 as inputs into the aid allocation model proxied.
- **World Governance Indicators** are used in indicator P3 to impute governance quality for countries that do not receive a country performance rating from the IMF. Specifically, we use two WGI – government effectiveness and regulatory quality.

Aggregation

For each indicator, we calculate the "raw score" and then the standardized "z-score." Raw scores are the measure of the indicator in the original measurement terms (e.g., proportion of total ODA that is tied). Given that these scores are made on different scales, standardising the raw values is necessary to enable aggregation across indicators to compare performance. Each provider's raw score for each indicator is therefore standardised as a z-score, with a mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Z-scores are calculated across all providers to allow for comparison across the entire sample.

We generate scores per each of the four dimensions by taking the mean of z-scores for each indicator within a dimension. These dimension scores are then z-scored to re-standardize. A mean of the dimension z-scores is used to identify overall performance and rank.

Treatment of missing data

The treatment of missing data differs across indicators based on the reason for omission.

- **Data not reported by providers**. In cases where providers are expected to report data to fulfil a global commitment but fail to do so, they receive a score of "zero" as penalty for non-responses. This is the case, for instance, for providers that do not report data to IATI, or for countries that do not report contracts data to the OECD's Contracts Database.
- **Indicator not applicable**. We include two indicators, that only apply to bilateral providers which are excluded from multilateral scores. Specifically, this is the case for indicator P4 (share of ODA provided as core multilateral support) and the T5 indicator on de facto untying. In both cases, multilateral agencies receive a "no score" or "blank" on this indicator. Practically, this means that

---

[17] Data can be downloaded from: https://github.com/hdesaioecd/oecd-sfr-2020-master-public/blob/main/data_out2020/Time%20series%20of%20Principal%20Component%20Analysis.csv

the average score for the prioritisation and transparency dimensions for multilateral agencies is the average of z-scores for the remaining indicators in these categories.

- **Data availability beyond provider control**. Missing data in the ownership and evaluation dimensions is due to either (a) no data reported in the GPEDC dataset for the relevant "ownership" variables, or (b) the absence of an OECD Peer Review or MOPAN assessment for "evaluation" indicators. In both cases, the absence of data is considered to be beyond the providers' control. As a result, we do not penalize providers for the absence of information and instead award a "no score" in cases of missing data.

In addition to these systematic examples, there are sometimes cases where judgement is required in assigning an indicator score. These are detailed in Annex 3.

Time lags

We caution that there are often time lags between policy and organisational changes within providers and the impact of these changes on allocation preferences and implementation policies. This means that recent substantive changes in policy or actions—such as the UK's ODA budget cuts[18]—will not appear in the data used to compile the current QuODA iteration.

Weightings and controls

All QuODA indicators are assigned an equal weight when calculating overall scores per dimension; and each of the four dimensions carries an equal weight in the overall score. We keep indicator weights equal for simplicity and as there are often no strong theoretical grounds for weighting certain indicators above others.[19] Of course, any index is shaped by the inclusion or exclusions of indicators. QuODA reflects the authors' judgement on the best available individual and collective group of indicators to assess ODA quality. We very much welcome feedback on these decisions and any evidence that may challenge them or make the case for additional or alternative measures.

In the computation of the QuODA, we measure all indicators in such a way to control for different sizes of ODA volumes, typically as a share of the relevant aid quantity denominator. The denominator used in each case is selected based on the concept being proxied for each indicator. By using shares, we hope to ensure that small and large providers are able to score equally well on our measures; the quality of ODA is not defined by its volume, but by the processes and allocation choices made when money is spent.

Data tests

We ran a sensitivity test on the QuODA indicators to ensure that scores per dimension were not being driven by outliers in any particular indicator. To do so, we calculated the changes in each providers' rank per dimension when each indicator is removed from the calculation. With the removal of any indicator, one rule of thumb is to consider large changes as being a third the size of the sample (we consider changes of more than 16 places in the rankings). The sensitivity test returns 16 instances (out of 49 x 17 = 833 combinations) of large changes in rank across our entire sample (five large changes for "prioritisation," four for "ownership," and seven for "transparency and untying." The most changes are seen in the "transparency and untying dimension" These changes are largely in cases where providers score well on CRS reporting, but do not report to IATI and are penalized on indicator T1 and T3b, accordingly. This informed our work exploring outliers below.

---

[18] See Mitchell et al. (2021)
[19] OECD and Joint Research Center (2008)

We considered whether and how to address outliers in the data, yet ultimately opted to leave extreme values untreated. Due to a small number of extreme values (less than five per indicator), we tested a method for "windsorizing" extreme values by assigning the next lowest or highest score to bring in the tails of the distribution. This approach is recommended by the European Commissions' Joint Research Center's guidance in cases where there are a small number of extreme outliers.[20] Our test showed that windsorizing extreme values had little bearing on the final results and that the added complexity of these approaches outweighed any benefit to the distribution of scores.

Website

The QuODA 2021 website presents the results in as follows:

1. **Ranks**. The main table and dimensions tabs allow users to explore the ranks of their agency relative to other providers. In all cases, the ranks are based on the simple average of the dimension z-scores (for the main table) or the indicator z-scores (for the dimension-specific view). The ranks are based on the dimensions or indicators selected. For instance, selecting all four dimensions on the main graphic will provide the overall rankings. If one dimension is deselected, then the ranks will adjust to those associated with the simple average of the z-scores for the remaining dimensions.

2. **Scaled values.** The main table and dimensions tabs visualise the results per dimension or indicator using coloured dots that represent agency scores on a scale of 0 to 100, where 100 represents "top performance." In both the *dimension view* (dots represent scores per dimension) and *indicator view* (where each dot represents a score for an indicator within a single dimension), the scaled values are calculated using a min-max transformation on the overall z-score for each dimension.

   The min-max scale is intended to represent the range of possible values with the max set at "top performance," and we set this level in different ways depending on the type of *indicator*. For indicators that are already calculated as a proportion or percentage (i.e., on a scale of 0 - 100) we present scores on the same scale, by calculating the transformation using the z-score equivalent to 0 and 100 percent as the min and max values. For indicators where the scale is continuous (indicator P2, P3, P5, P5a, T2 and T2b), the maximum value is set at 0.25 of a standard deviation above the top z-score achieved by providers and the minimum value is set to 0.25 of a standard deviation below the lowest z-score.

   In performing the min-max transformation for the *dimension* scores, we add 0.25 of a standard deviation to the maximum z-score achieved on the dimension and subtract 0.25 of a standard deviation from the lowest z-score to create the minimum value. Across the dimensions, there are no instances of providers achieving the perfect or worst score on all indicators; this method assumes that providers have room for improvement.

Part 2. QuODA indicator descriptions

This section describes the rationale and calculation of each of the 17 indicators in the 2021 QuODA edition. Descriptions of indicators matching prior QuODA iterations are taken, sometimes verbatim, from the second edition of the QuODA methodology published in 2011 and the 2018 QuODA methodology. The second edition of the QuODA methodology was the work of Nancy Birdsall (Center for Global Development), Homi Kharas (Brookings Institution), and Rita Perakis (Center for Global Development).[21]

---

[20] See: https://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/4.COIN_2019_Step%203%20Outliers.pdf
[21] Birdsall et al. (2011)

The 2018 QuODA Update was largely based on indicators still available in the prior methodology and compiled by Caitlin McKee and Ian Mitchell (Center for Global Development).

Prioritisation

P1: ODA spent in partner countries (share of)

A substantial portion of what is termed "official development assistance" does not represent actual transfers of funds to partner countries. Providers can make a greater development impact by increasing the share of ODA that providers programme to support development projects in their partner countries. The DAC, recognising the need for a metric that reflects the amount of ODA that is received and recorded by partner country governments, constructed a measure called Country Programmable Aid (CPA).[22] CPA is a measure of development assistance that excludes funding that does not flow to partner countries (e.g., administrative costs and imputed student costs), unpredictable flows (e.g., humanitarian assistance), and transfers that are not discussed between providers and partner countries (e.g., food assistance).

To measure the share of ODA that is transferred or programmable in partner countries, we employed an adjusted version of CPA, which we call aCPA. We calculated aCPA by subtracting ODA spent on research conducted within provider countries from the CPA figures published by the OECD, and adding in humanitarian and food aid, which we assume are cross-border flows that reached partner countries. We then measured the share of gross bilateral ODA that aCPA represented for each donor. Although this indicator offers a useful comparison of relative provider performance, as with other indicators in the QuODA assessment, the relative performance depends on a provider's adherence to the definitions used for self-reporting ODA information.

Analysis based on:

$$P1\ Score_d = \frac{aCPA_d + Humanitarian\ ODA_d + Food\ ODA_d}{ODA_d}$$

Note: Subscript d denotes donor country

Note: aCPA = gross disbursements of CPA minus in-donor research costs.

Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System; OECD Country Programmable Aid dataset

P2: Allocations to poor countries (weighted share)

Although development cooperation providers allocate ODA to achieve multiple objectives, one objective they share is improving the lives of poor people around the world. Since the 1970s, many researchers have developed and tested models of ODA allocations to gain an understanding of the determinants of providers' decisions and to assess the marginal impact of ODA on development based on certain factors.[23] Few widely accepted generalizations have emerged from these studies; however, most of them have found a significant positive impact of providing more funding to relatively poorer countries.[24] Providers can make a bigger impact on poverty reduction by providing a larger share of ODA to poorer countries.

This indicator measures the extent to which development cooperation is allocated towards the poorest countries. To do so, we weight bilateral finance contributions to each partner using the inverse of the income level of the recipient partner country or region,[25] so that ODA flows to higher income recipients receive a smaller weight. This mirrors the concept of diminishing marginal utility of income: the benefits,

---

[22] See Benn et al. (2010)

[23] McGillivray (1989), Collier and Dollar (2002), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Dayton-Johnson and Hoddinott (2003), and Easterly et al. (2003).

[24] Ibid.

[25] Income level data is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $)

or "utility," a partner enjoys from a dollar of income reduces as the income rises. For each provider, we multiply the share of its cross-border ODA[26] that it sends to each country by the "poverty weighting" of that country. We sum these across all partner countries to give its poverty focus score.

Analysis based on:

$$P2\ Score_d = \sum_{r=1}^{R} Poverty\ Weight_r * \frac{Cross\ Border\ ODA_{d,r}}{\sum_{r=1}^{R} Cross\ Border\ ODA_{d,r}}$$

Note: Subscripts d and r respectively refer to donor and recipient countries.

Source: Income data is taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and is supplemented by data from the CIA World Factbook when missing from the WDI dataset; ODA data taken from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System.

P3: Contributions to under-aided countries

A major theme of the Agenda 2030 to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals is the pledge to "leave no one behind" and "endeavour to reach the furthest behind first."[27] Yet recent studies have shown that providers tend to follow the "herd," often trailing the largest providers and crowding-in to certain partner countries.[28] As providers continue to fund aid "darlings," aid "orphans" are left behind. While Indicator P2 measures the extent to which providers are individually targeting their ODA towards the poorest countries, Indicator P3 captures how well providers are playing their part in the *overall provider system*. In other words, it tracks the extent to which providers are exacerbating or alleviating the problem of aid orphans by rewarding providers that fill gaps in the global aid allocation. This approach does not prescribe which specific country each provider should prioritise and still allows for an appropriate division of labour, for example, by recognising that France is more likely to engage in Francophone countries, and that doing so could be helpful if other providers allocate less support to such countries.

This indicator measures the extent to which each provider moves the global distribution of CPA towards or away from an optimal allocation. Our "optimal" allocation is based on the model used by the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA), which bases allocations on a combination of partner country need (population size and GNI per capita) and governance quality (World Bank's Country Performance Ratings).[29] Given that most international providers allocate resources through IDA, this model can be said to command some degree of international support. We adjust the base IDA model to expand the list of eligible countries included in the optimal allocation and to adjust for anomalies in the data; a full and detailed list of our adjustments to the IDA model is available in Annex 4.

This indicator is calculated as the change in the sum of the squared differences between the global actual and optimal allocation for each recipient country caused by the removal of each providers' spending from global allocation, divided by the providers' share of global allocations. We use CPA rather than ODA as the basis for this calculation as CPA better captures predictable, cross-border, government-to-government transfers that can be used by partner countries to support their development.[30]

For example: Take an imaginary recipient country R whose optimal aid allocation is 4 percent of global CPA. In this hypothetical scenario, it actually receives 2 percent of global CPA, but if donor country D is

---

[26] Cross-border ODA as calculated excludes debt relief, imputed student costs, costs related to refugees in provider countries, the promotion of development awareness, administrative costs, and research conducted within provider countries.
[27] United Nations (2015)
[28] Davies and Klasen (2019)
[29] For more information on the IDA model and how the World Bank calculates country performance ratings, see World Bank (2020). For countries that do not receive a CPR from the World Bank, we impute governance quality values.
[30] Benn et al. (2010)

removed from this aggregate, then R instead receives just 1 percent of global CPA. Country D therefore causes the squared difference between the actual and optimal aid allocations for country R to reduce from 9 (=(1%-4%)^2) to 4 (=(2%-4%)^2). The change here is 5 (=9-4). This exercise is repeated for each recipient country, and country D's P3 score is then based on the sum of these changes. To arrive at country D's final P3 score, this sum is divided by D's share of global CPA.

Analysis based on:[31]

$$P3\ Score_d = \left(\sum_{r=1}^{R} \left(\left(\frac{\left(\sum_{d=1}^{D} CPA_{d,r} \right) - CPA_{d,r}}{\left(\sum_{d=1}^{D} \sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r} \right) - \sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}} \right) - Optimal\ Global\ Aid\ Allocation_r \right)^2 \right.$$
$$\left. - \sum_{r=1}^{R} \left(\left(\frac{\sum_{d=1}^{D} CPA_{d,r}}{\sum_{d=1}^{D} \sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}} \right) - Optimal\ Global\ Aid\ Allocation_r \right)^2 \right)$$
$$/ \left(\frac{\sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}}{\sum_{d=1}^{D} \sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}} \right)$$

Note: Optimal global aid allocations for each recipient r are expressed proportions of global CPA.

Sources: OECD CPA database; WB World Development Indicators (for population & GNI per capita; missing GNI values are supplemented using data from the CIA World Factbook); WB CPR Historical Series[32] (for CPR); WB Worldwide Governance Indicators (for its Government Effectiveness & Regulatory Quality indicators).

P4: Core support to multilaterals (share of ODA)
By channelling more ODA through multilaterals, providers can reduce the transaction costs incurred by partner countries and support countries and sectors for which they have less expertise. Multilateral agencies typically have large, streamlined operations in their partner countries, and use of multilateral channels implies up-front harmonization with other agencies.

For bilateral providers, we captured contributions to multilaterals by measuring the share of total gross ODA disbursements channelled as core support to multilateral agencies.[33] Non-core funds to multilateral agencies are excluded because they have varying degrees of constraints on their use, making them noncomparable to core multilateral support.[34] Multilateral agencies are excluded from this indicator.

Analysis based on: $P4\ Score_d = \frac{Core\ Multilateral\ ODA_d}{ODA_d}$

Source: DAC Table 1

P5: Share of ODA supporting (a) fragile states and (b) selected global public goods[35]
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognised global contributions global challenges—such as peace and security and climate change—as critical actions to support ongoing poverty reduction and long-term development. Indeed, recent evidence has shown that the global poverty landscape is shifting, with global poverty increasingly concentrated in fragile states.[36] Moreover, challenges related to funding global public goods (GPGs), which tend to be underfunded by domestic and private actors due to their

---

[31] See Annex 4 for greater technical detail on how QuODA's P3 indicator is calculated.
[32] Available here: https://ida.worldbank.org/financing/resource-management/ida-country-performance-ratings
[33] A spreadsheet that contains the names of the multilateral agency channels that can be reported to the DAC can be found here: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/annex2.htm
[34] Non-core funds are earmarked for specific sectors, themes, countries, or regions.
[35] Text in this section adapted from McKee et al. (2020).
[36] Kharas and Rogerson (2012)

globally diffuse, non-rival, and non-excludable characteristics, have meant that some funding for such actions is being drawn from ODA budgets.

This indicator captures ODA contributions to support engagement in fragile states and as GPGs as the average of z-scores on two indicators:

> **P5a. Fragility-weighted allocations**: This sub-indicator measures the extent to which development cooperation is allocated towards fragile countries. We use the OECD's States of Fragility measure to capture the fragility of partner countries. We then weight bilateral ODA flows by multiplying the share of provider ODA allocated to each partner by the OECD's fragility scores[37] and summing the weighted values, per provider. This gives us a fragility-focused score, per provider.
>
> Analysis based on:

$$P5a\ Score_d = \sum_{r=1}^{R} Fragility\ Weight_r * \frac{ODA_{d,r}}{\sum_{r=1}^{R} ODA_{d,r}}$$

> Source: ODA data from the OECD's Creditor Reporting System; fragility data taken from the OECD's States of Fragility Report.
>
> **P5b. Share of ODA supporting global public goods**: This sub-indicator measures the proportion of total ODA allocated to the provision of global public goods (GPGs). For all providers, we calculate the share of gross bilateral disbursements allocated to GPG-relevant purpose codes, channels, and policy markers in the OECD's CRS database (see Annex 5 for a full list of codes used in the calculation of this indicator).[38] For bilateral providers, we also calculate the imputed share of core multilateral contributions allocated to GPGs, to account for resources provided via the multilateral system. This is calculated by multiplying the share of multilateral organisations' spending on GPGs by the core contributions made to that multilateral per provider. For instance: if bilateral donor X makes a core contribution of $100m to multilateral organisation Y, and if multilateral Y allocates 20 percent of its ODA gross disbursements to provide GPGs, then $20m of imputed GPG-spend will be reckoned to donor X.
>
> Analysis based on:

$$P5b\ Score_d = \frac{ODA\ spent\ on\ GPGs\ (including\ imputed\ spend\ via\ multilaterals)_d}{ODA_d}$$

> Source: OECD's Creditor Reporting System; OECD Members' Total Use of the Multilateral System database

---

[37] In its raw form, lower OECD fragility scores represent higher levels of fragility. We multiply these scores by -1 so that higher fragility is denoted by a higher value.

[38] This approach builds on recent studies by Gavas et al. (2017), which uses purpose codes to identify the share of GPG spend in ODA, and Knox (2016), which does the same using policy markers and a small sample of channel codes. The codes align to key GPG themes identified in the literature: climate change mitigation; environmental sustainability; communicable disease; trade, peace & security; research & knowledge; transparency, anti-corruption & international crime; regional integration & cooperation; and norms & standards. Channel codes were identified as being GPG related through a desk review and coding of agency mandates, conducted in 2019. For the policy markers, we only include spending with a "principal" mitigation or environmental purpose, as the "significant" marker can overstate effort.

Ownership

The indicators included in this section draw exclusively from data compiled by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as part of the 2018 Monitoring Round. While the voluntary nature of the GPEDC monitoring round approach means that the number of responses differs across providers, this data remains the best available proxy for "ownership" currently available.

One concern that has been raised around the inclusion of indicators to proxy ownership is that strong performance on these indicators may be more difficult for providers that focus on engaging in fragile or conflict-affected regions. We tested whether this was the case by correlating the GPEDC scores assigned for each dyadic pair (partner and provider) with the fragility scores of partner countries using the OECD's definition of fragility and the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Scores. This analysis showed a weak and inconsistent relationship between fragility and scores on the GPEDC indicators used in QuODA. As a result, we have not adjusted the GPEDC indicators to account for the fragility of the responding partner.[39]

O1: Alignment of development interventions to partner objectives and frameworks

If providers use their own objectives from results frameworks to design, plan, and evaluate development interventions, then the goals of the providers may be prioritised instead of those of the partner country, undermining the frameworks and institutions of partner country governments. Instead, providers should seek to use partner country-owned results frameworks to align with partner government priorities. These may include any form of government-led planning instrument where development priorities and goals are clearly defined, such as long-term vision documents, national development plans, or sector plans. Similarly, providers should seek to engage with the partner country to define the scope of evaluations and jointly implement them. The idea that providers should use partner country results frameworks to increase the focus on development results that meet country priorities was set forth in the Paris Declaration and reaffirmed in the Accra commitments and Busan High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness.

To measure the alignment of providers activities with partner frameworks, we take the average of the z-scores of two sub-indicators:

> **O1a. Share of development interventions using objectives from partner country frameworks:** This sub-indicator measures the proportion of new development interventions that draw their objectives from country-led results frameworks using data sourced from the GPEDC 2018 monitoring round (Indicator 1a.1).[40] The GPEDC asks respondents to report for the top six development interventions of significant size (US$ 100,000 and above) approved during the year of reference.[41] For these interventions the indicator calculates the degree to which development partners rely on objectives, drawn from government sources. While we recognise that country results frameworks may themselves be influenced by providers and their priorities, suggesting that the indicator may not be a pure metric of partner preferences, this indicator remains the best available option.
>
> Analysis based on: Percentage of providers' new interventions that draw their objectives and development focus from partner country-owned results frameworks.
>
> Source: 2018 GPEDC Monitoring report, Indicator 1a.1

---

[39] For more on the results of this analysis, please see Annex 6.
[40] For more information on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), see https://www.effectivecooperation.org. For detailed methodology of the indicators in the 2018 monitoring round see OECD and UN (2019) and https://www.effectivecooperation.org/landing-page/2018-monitoring-results
[41] GPEDC (2018)

O1b. Share of evaluations planned with partner countries: To measure provider engagement with partner countries for evaluating development interventions, we rely on data from the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) 2018 monitoring round. We use one element of Indicator 1a.4 that measures the proportion of new development interventions with a final evaluation that engages the partner country government in evaluating the results. The GPEDC asks respondents to report for the top six development interventions of significant size (US$ 100,000 and above) approved during the year of reference.[42] The indicator calculates the share of interventions that undergo a final evaluation with partner country government involvement.

Analysis based on: Percentage of new interventions that plan a final (ex post) evaluation funded by the government, or jointly by the government and the provider.

Source: 2018 GPEDC Monitoring report, Indicator 1a.4

O2: Use of country financial systems

A country's ownership of ODA is dampened by its partner governments' uncertainty about the amount of ODA flowing into their countries and by limited use of country public financial management systems. Providers can better align their efforts with partner policies and systems by increasingly reporting ODA commitments to partners for inclusion in their budgets. The share of ODA recorded in partner budgets is reduced when development cooperation providers do not share information on their support to the government in a timely and comprehensive manner. Similarly, increased use of public financial management systems will enable providers to support the institutions critical for long-run development.

At the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, which took place in Busan in 2011, providers committed to "strengthen the role of parliaments in the oversight of development processes"; and in the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008, providers committed to "facilitate parliamentary oversight by implementing greater transparency in public financial management, including public disclosure of revenues, budgets, expenditures." This indicator measures providers' use of partner country financial management systems as the average of the z-scores of two sub-indicators measuring:

O2a. Share of ODA recorded in partner country budgets: this sub-indicator measures the percentage of development cooperation funding scheduled for disbursement by development partners that is recorded in the annual budgets approved by the legislature of a given country. The data comes from the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) 2018 monitoring round (indicator 6.1).

Analysis based on: Numerator: Development cooperation funding recorded in annual budget for year n. Denominator: Development cooperation funding scheduled for disbursement in year n by cooperation providers and communicated to developing country government at the outset of year n.

Source: 2018 GPEDC Monitoring report, Indicator 6.1

O2b. Use of partner country public financial management systems: this sub-indicator measures the proportion of development cooperation disbursed to the government using the partner country's own financial management and procurement systems. This includes using the country's own rules and procedures—versus those of the development partner—for budget execution, financial reporting, auditing, and procurement of goods and services. Data is taken from

---

[42] GPEDC (2018)

the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) 2018 monitoring round (Indicator 9b).

Analysis based on: Numerator: Development cooperation flows using country systems (average of budget execution, financial reporting, auditing and procurement systems). Denominator: Total development cooperation flows for the government sector.

Source: 2018 GPEDC Monitoring report, Indicator 9b

O3: Predictability and reliability of ODA

ODA that is predictable and recorded as received by partner governments in a timely manner enables governments to manage their resources better, use ODA for long-term development initiatives, and inform their citizens about the resources and development projects the government is undertaking. Similarly, poor information on a provider's future ODA commitments limits partner countries' and other providers' ability to incorporate that provider's support into long-term plans about funding needs and ODA allocations. When providers publicly provide forward spending information, they enable partner countries and other providers to improve their long-term planning and decision-making.

This indicator measures the predictability and reliability of ODA as the average of the z-score of two sub-indicators:

O3a. Share of scheduled ODA recorded as received by partner countries: This sub-indicator captures the short-term predictability of ODA commitments. We rely on data from the GPEDC 2018 monitoring round. We use Indicator 5a, which measures the share of development cooperation funding that is disbursed to the partner government within the fiscal year for which it was scheduled by the provider. It captures both the reliability of providers in delivering the promised resources within the relevant year and their capacity to accurately forecast and disburse this funding (i.e., implement their development cooperation activities) within a 12-month period.

Analysis based on: Numerator: Development cooperation flows reported by provider as disbursed in year n. Denominator: Development cooperation flows scheduled for disbursement by provider in year n and communicated to developing country government.

Source: 2018 GPEDC Monitoring report, Indicator 5a.1

O3b. Coverage of forward spending plans: This sub-indicator measures the estimated proportion of development cooperation covered by indicative forward expenditure and/or implementation plans for one, two, and three years ahead. The forward spending plan must meet all of the following criteria in order to be included in the results: be made available by the development partner in written or electronic form; set out clearly indicative information on future spending and / or implementation activities in the country; present funding amounts (at least) by year, while using the partner country's own fiscal year; be comprehensive in its coverage of known sectors, types and modalities of support; and clearly state the amount and currency of funding. This indicator draws on data from the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) 2018 monitoring round, specifically Indicator 5b.

Analysis based on: The average proportion of development cooperation funding covered by indicative forward expenditure or implementation plans at the country level, for one, two and three years ahead.

Source: 2018 GPEDC Monitoring report, Indicator 5b.

O4: Partner feedback – share of aid covered by GPEDC responses

The GPEDC monitoring process is a voluntary and country-led exercise used to measure provider performance against internationally agreed principles for effective development cooperation, including country ownership. In the 2018 Monitoring Round (the latest available), 86 partner countries and territories reported data on providers' performance and commitment to meeting ownership goals.[43] However, the voluntary nature of GPEDC reporting means that response rates are inconsistent across indicators and providers. This leads to cases where overall performance scores are sometimes based on responses from a single partner country, or from a partner that receives a small share of provider ODA. Poor and differential response rates across providers and indicators raise questions around the reliability of such scores, and the degree to which they represent an accurate depiction of provider performance.

This indicator captures the share of CPA allocated to countries that respond to the GPEDC for each provider. We calculate response rates based on the share of CPA received by respondents to account for differences in partner size and the relative scale of engagement with providers (i.e., a single respondent that accounts for 25 percent of a provider's CPA can speak to provider performance across a larger share of the development portfolio than a single respondent that accounts for only a minor share of ODA). We use CPA rather than ODA on the basis that CPA better captures flows that reach partner countries through government-to-government transfers, over which providers have clearer opportunities to support country ownership. We use 2017 CPA data to match the year when the GPEDC survey was conducted.[44]

Analysis based on:

$$O4 \ Score_d = \frac{CPA \ to \ partners \ that \ submit \ a \ GPEDC \ response \ survey_d}{CPA_d}$$

Source: GPEDC Provider-Recipient dataset; OECD CPA dataset

Transparency & untying

T1: Aid reported in IATI

Increased transparency in ODA improves accountability between the intended beneficiaries, partner country governments, providers, and civil society.[45] Publishing information also allows stakeholders to use it for planning and research. Access to key information about individual ODA projects can better inform planning and monitoring by partner countries, providers, researchers, and civil society organizations worldwide. Participation in—and regular and complete reporting to—global efforts to increase ODA transparency, such as the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI),[46] demonstrates providers' commitment to improve access to information on their activities.

This indicator measures the coverage of provider reporting to IATI relative to ODA and other official flows[47] reported to the CRS, to identify the proportion of disbursed flows that are published to the IATI

---

[43] https://www.effectivecooperation.org/landing-page/2018-monitoring-results
[44] For the FAO, we calculate this indicator using CPA data for 2018. This is because the FAO's 2017 CPA data does not provide information by country. Seeing as the FAO received a relatively large number of responses to the GPEDC survey, we did not want to penalize it artificially due to poor CPA data, especially seeing as the 2016 and 2018 CPA data for the FAO is available by country.
[45] GPEDC's fourth principle is "Transparency and accountability to each other: Mutual accountability and accountability to the intended beneficiaries of development co-operation, as well as to respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders, is critical to delivering results. Transparent practices form the basis for enhanced accountability."
[46] IATI is a multistakeholder initiative through which members—providers, partner countries, and civil society organisations—commit to work together to establish a common standard for making aid more transparent. It emerged during the Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2008 and has as its objective not the creation of another set of databases, but the establishment of a set of standards for reporting information on aid activities.
[47] Other official flows are defined by the OECD (2021) as "official sector transactions that do not meet official development assistance (ODA) criteria".

standard.[48] This methodology—which includes other official flows in the calculation—mirrors the method used by GPEDC for the "IATI coverage" portion of GPEDC Indicator 4 on transparency.[49]

Analysis based on: $T1\ Score_d = \dfrac{ODA\ and\ OOF\ reported\ to\ IATI_d}{ODA\ and\ OOF\ reported\ to\ the\ CRS_d}$

Source: IATI registry and OECD's CRS database

T2: Comprehensiveness of CRS project-level data

Providers that are members of the OECD-DAC commit to provide specific information about each of their ODA projects to the CRS database. DAC statistics currently provide the most comprehensive information about ODA disbursements available. Providers should strive to provide complete records of this information for the benefit of a range of stakeholders.

This indicator measures the coverage and comprehensiveness of DAC provider reporting to the CRS using four sub-indicators. The raw values of each sub-indicator is standardised into z-scores. We take the simple average of the z-scores for the three sub-indicators to derive the overall score for T2, per provider. The three sub-indicators underlying this measure include:

1. **T2a. CRS Comprehensiveness - Recording of Project Titles & Descriptions.** In the CRS database there are three fields in which providers disclose information about projects: title, short description, and long description. To measure the disclosure of key project information, we average the percentage of each of these fields that was completed for each ODA activity, by provider in 2019. In other words, a value of 70 percent means that 70 percent of the three fields across all of a provider's ODA activities in 2018 were populated in the CRS database.

    Analysis based on:

$T2a\ Score_d$
$= \dfrac{No.\ projects\ with\ completed\ title_d + No.\ projects\ with\ completed\ short\ describtion_d + No.\ projects\ with\ completed\ long\ description_d}{3 * Number\ of\ total\ reported\ projects_d}$

    Source: DAC Creditor Reporting System

2. **T2b. CRS Comprehensiveness - Detail of Long Descriptions.** The long description entry for ODA projects reported in the CRS offers providers an opportunity to communicate more details than are captured in the other project fields. We measure this aspect of provider transparency by taking the natural logarithm of the average character count in the long description fields. Using a logarithm emphasises changes at the lower end of the spectrum of character counts.

    Analysis based on: $T2b\ Score_d = \ln\left(\dfrac{No.\ characters\ in\ all\ long\ descriptions_d}{No.\ long\ description\ entries_d}\right)$

    Source: DAC Creditor Reporting System

3. **T2c. CRS Comprehensiveness – Reporting of ODA Delivery Channel.** Provider support to a partner country can be channelled through partner government agencies, international NGOs, domestic NGOs, multilateral agencies, and other entities. By providing specific information on

---

[48] Publish What You Fund's Aid Transparency Index (ATI) assesses attributes for the aid funding that is published to the IATI registry. The purpose of this proposed indicator is to measure what proportion of a provider's aid flows are published to see how much aid is available for use and scrutiny by other stakeholders - which the ATI does not assess. For details of what the Aid Transparency Index assesses, see Publish What You Fund (2020).

[49] The methodology used for this indicator is taken from GPEDC (2016) p.10. This note was shared by the GPEDC secretariat. In order to compare aid flows reported to the CRS and IATI, reporting organisations to each had to be matched. This matching is laid out in Annex 7.

delivery channels for their ODA projects, providers can enable better tracking of the movement of ODA flows.

This sub-indicator measures the share of projects by provider for which a specific channel name was reported to the CRS, weighted by the financial size of projects. Entries that were not sufficiently informative—such as a response of "other," "unknown," or "not available," or categories without specific names—were excluded. A higher share of projects reporting a specific channel name is considered more transparent.

Analysis based on: $T2c\ Score_d = \frac{ODA\ for\ projects\ with\ delivery\ channel\ specified_d}{ODA_d}$

Source: DAC Creditor Reporting System

T3: Timeliness and frequency of published projects data (IATI & CRS)

The timeliness and frequency of data publishing is important for transparency. Data which is up to date and available is much more useful for a range of stakeholders. This indicator is based upon two sub-components, which respectively measure the timeliness of providers reporting to the CRS, and the timeliness and frequency of reporting to IATI.

Each sub-indicator makes use of a methodology developed by the GPEDC, which is used as an input into Indicator 4 reported in the GPEDC Monitoring Round.[50] Both sub-indicators are standardised into z-scores. QuODA's T3 indicator is then calculated as the simple average of the T3A and T3B z-scores.

T3a. CRS Timeliness. To assess the timeliness of providers reporting to the CRS, GPEDC uses a three-point scale, presented below. We coded data on provider reporting dates to the CRS accordingly. Data on the dates of reporting to the CRS was provided directly by the OECD.

Score	CRS Timeliness
1	Reporting of data from previous year received after more than 2.5 months after the deadline*
2	Reporting of data from previous year received between the deadline* and 2.5 months after the deadline*
3	Reporting of data from previous year received before the deadline*

*15th July for DAC members and non-DAC countries; 31st May for multilateral organisations and private foundations.

Source: Scoring rubric taken from GPEDC (2016) p.8.

Analysis based on: Coded date of CRS submissions to the OECD.

Source: Provider reporting dates to the CRS supplied to us by the OECD-DAC upon request.

T3b. IATI Timeliness and Frequency. To assess the timeliness and frequency of providers reporting to IATI, the GPEDC approach uses a scale of 0-4, presented below. We coded data on providers' timeliness and frequency in reporting to IATI accordingly. Each provider's score for IATI timeliness and frequency were then summed to a total out of a maximum score of eight. In cases where multiple ODA-spending agencies report to IATI, we assessed the timeliness and frequency of reporting for the lead agency only (i.e., the agency responsible for spending the largest share of the development budget).

---

[50] The methodology for this indicator is taken from GPEDC (2016) p.8. This note was shared by the GPEDC secretariat.

Score	IATI Timeliness	IATI Frequency
0	More than one-year lag (no transactions reported for the last 12 months)	No reporting (less than annual)
1	Annual lag (transactions reported for one of the last twelve months)	Annual reporting
2	Semi-annual lag (transactions reported for one of the last six months)	Semi-annual reporting
3	Quarterly lag (transactions reported for one of the last three months)	Quarterly reporting
4	Monthly lag (transactions reported for two of the last three months)	Monthly reporting

Source: Author's compilation based on tables available from: GPEDC (2016) p.8

Analysis based on: IATI timeliness score plus IATI frequency score.

Source: IATI Dashboard Publishing Statistics on Frequency[51] and Timelag.[52]

T4: Untied ODA share (official)

Some ODA resources are offered under the condition that the goods and services they fund be procured from suppliers based in the provider country. Because the same goods and services may be available at lower cost from other countries, these resources are used more efficiently in the partner country if they are untied. For five decades the international community has condemned the practice of tying ODA.[53] In 2001 DAC members committed to untie 100 percent of ODA to the least developed countries, and in the Paris Declaration, providers committed to further reduce the share of tied ODA they provide to partner countries.

We used data reported in the DAC Creditor Reporting System on the tying status of ODA to compute the share of total ODA that is untied for each provider. Partially tied ODA is given a weight of 0.5 in calculating the share of untied ODA. Most multilateral agencies are assumed to have 100 percent untied ODA. However, there is some evidence that the EU, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Islamic Development Bank tie a portion of their ODA (see Annex 8).[54] For the EU, this means that countries which provide core support to the EU have a portion of their spending tied via allocations. In this case, we account for EU tying by multiplying the share of EU cooperation that is tied, as calculated using the methodology above, by each provider's core contributions to EU institutions.[55] The resulting figure is added to the volume of tied bilateral resources (in the numerator), while total core contributions to EU institutions are included in the denominator. For the ADB and IDB, which appear to tie procurement to bank membership, we assign the equivalent of the lowest score identified across providers. The Islamic Development Bank is awarded the average score as its procurement documents note that it "normally

---

[51] Data available from the IATI website at: http://publishingstats.iatistandard.org/timeliness.html
[52] Data available from the IATI website at: http://publishingstats.iatistandard.org/timeliness_timelag.html
[53] In 1968, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development released a paper identifying and discussing the impact of tied aid. This report was followed by a condemnation of the practice by the Pearson Commission. Jepma (1991) found that the value of aid was reduced 13 to 23 percent by the practice of tying.
[54] The EU reports the tied share of ODA to the CRS like other bilateral providers. The ADB (2017) procurement policy states that loans and grants from ADB resources "can be used only for procurement of goods, works and services produced in, and supplied from, member countries" (p. 3). IDB notes that "Funds from the Bank loans can be used only for the payment of goods, works, and services contracted with firms or individuals from Bank member countries" (p. 3). For more, please see Annex 8.
[55] Data on core contributions to EU institutions is sourced from OECD members' total use of the multilateral system dataset.

requires" internationally competitive bidding, but that other methods of procurement are allowed depending on the project's requirements.

Analysis based on: $T4\ Score_d = \frac{Untied\ ODA_d + (Partially\ Tied\ ODA_d * 0.5)}{Untied\ ODA_d + Partially\ Tied\ ODA_d + Tied\ ODA_d}$

Source: OECD-DAC Creditor Reporting System and Members' use of the multilateral system (for EU core contributions data)

T5: Untied ODA share (contracts)

While providers have made significant progress towards meeting the DAC recommendation for de jure ODA untying, ODA spending can be de facto tied when providers disproportionately grant ODA contracts to domestic consultants, researchers, or implementing partners over international choices. Analysis has shown that in 2014, OECD-DAC providers reported that around 46 percent of the value of all ODA contracts were awarded to the providers' domestic companies.[56] In such cases, providers could use informal barriers to prevent or limit competitive tendering.[57]

This indicator captures the share of ODA that is de facto untied. To do so, we calculate tied aid as the share of contract value awarded by each provider to domestic companies beyond the share of total global contracts awarded to the provider.[58] By measuring the level of de facto tying relative to the share of global contracts that each provider commands, we essentially scale the indicator by the size of the domestic market for development professionals. Doing so ensures that providers are not penalized for awarding contracts to domestic recipients in cases where their development sectors are large on a global scale (i.e., in cases such as the US and UK, which have relatively large development sectors). In such cases, we would reasonably expect providers to award domestic companies a share of contracts equal to the relative size of their domestic development sector.

Analysis based on:

$$T5\ Score_d = 1 - \left(\left(\frac{Value\ of\ contracts\ awarded\ to\ domestic\ companies_d}{Total\ value\ of\ contracts\ awarded_d}\right) - \left(\frac{Value\ of\ global\ contracts\ won_d}{Total\ value\ of\ global\ contracts}\right)\right)$$

Source: 2020 Report on the DAC Untying Recommendation, Table A.9[59]; contracts data used to calculate the market share was provided by the OECD.

Evaluation

This section presents three new composite indicators designed to capture the quality of providers' evaluation (E1), learning (E2), and results-based management systems (E3). In each case, the indicators are based on a set of sub-indicators that are comparable across bilateral and multilateral agencies. The indicators—and the sub-indicators included in each—are based on a framework developed by the OECD-DAC in its *Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance* and the *DAC Quality Standards for Development Evaluation.*[60]

---

[56] Meeks (2017)

[57] Ibid.

[58] The OECD does not report data on the value of contracts won by EU Institutions (used to calculate the market share), on the basis that the EU is not a country. Instead, we calculate the EU's market share using the sum of the value of contracts awarded to EU member countries. We include the UK in this calculation as the data pertains to 2017-18, at which point it was part of the EU.

[59] Data on the market share of contracts received by providers was provided to CGD by the OECD. Data on value of contracts awarded to in-donor companies is available from OECD (2021). Netherlands, Norway and Slovakia did not report data to the OECD in 2017-18 and are awarded the equivalent of the lowest score as a penalty. Ireland reports that it did not issue any contracts in 2017-18; it receives a "no score" as a result.

[60] For more details, please see McKee et al. (2020) and Blampied et al. (2020).

Scores for these indicators draw from qualitative assessments of development providers conducted in the OECD Peer Reviews (bilateral providers) and Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) assessments (for multilateral agencies), both of which include measures of the quality of learning and evaluations systems based on the DAC's guidance. For each sub-indicator, we mapped the relevant sections of the Peer Reviews and MOPAN assessment where data is provided.

For the MOPAN reviews, data is already presented as a numeric score as part of the assessment process. For multilateral agencies, we derive the final score per indicator by averaging the scores on each sub-indicator, provided in the MOPAN reviews. For bilateral agencies, qualitative data presented in Chapter 6 of the DAC Peer Reviews (section on evaluation and learning) was hand-coded by CGD using the same underlying scoring framework developed by MOPAN. On each sub-indicator, agencies were awarded a score on a scale of 0-4, where 4 represents "highly satisfactory", while a score of 0 means that the element is not present or is considered "highly unsatisfactory." By using the same coding methodology as for the MOPAN reviews, we ensure that scores across agencies are comparable. A full description of the indicators and scoring methodology is available in Annex 9.

We acknowledge that this approach has several limitations. First, while we have attempted to ensure that our methodology is as objective and comparable as possible, all coding approaches rely on the judgement of CGD reviewers and include a degree of subjectivity. Second, due to the periodic assessment of OECD Peer Reviews, which are conducted every 5-6 years, it is possible that the most recent assessment does not reflect the current state of the evaluation systems. Third, in most cases, our sub-indicators capture the presence of a particular facet of evaluation or learning systems but are admittedly unable to account for the quality of evaluation policies, their suitability for the providers' development management context, or how well the systems function in practice. While we will continue to watch for new and better assessments of the quality of learning and evaluation systems to inform future QuODA iterations, our current approach represents our best attempt to capture the quality of evaluation systems given the data currently available.

E1: Evaluation systems

Evaluations can support better quality ODA by acting as a valuable input to inform decision-making and learning from past experience. Previous iterations of QuODA included an indicator on the "quality of evaluation policy," which measured whether evaluation policies were independent, that results were transparent, contributed to learning, and that the scope of evaluations was enshrined in policy. We build on this approach using a broader suite of sub-indicators and methodology based on evaluations conducted by the OECD.

This indicator is a composite measure of the quality of evaluation systems, calculated by averaging provider scores on four sub-indicators:

1. **Policy**: Evaluation policy with defined roles and responsibilities
2. **Plan and budget**: Dedicated evaluation plan and budget to allow consistent coverage of activities
3. **Independence**: Evaluation function is independent and impartial
4. **Expertise**: Sufficient expertise and systems in place to ensure quality

Scores for each sub-indicator are taken from the MOPAN assessments and DAC Peer Reviews using the approach outlined above. We take the simple average of scores presented in the sub-indicators to find the overall score for this indicator.

Analysis based on: The average score on each sub-indicator; scores taken from MOPAN assessments or coded from the DAC Peer Reviews (chapter 6).

Source: OECD Peer Reviews and MOPAN assessments.

E2: Learning systems

The ability to use and learn from evaluations can contribute to more informed decision-making and effective practices. This indicator captures the quality of providers' institutional learning systems in order to capture whether agencies use past assessments and evaluations to inform better policies.

This indicator is a composite measure of the quality of learning systems, calculated by averaging provider scores on three sub-indicators:

1. **Accountability**: Programme management and accountability systems ensure follow-up on recommendations and learning
2. **Knowledge management:** A knowledge management system based on results and evidence is used and there is uptake of lessons and best practices
3. **Improvement**: The provider has implemented past recommendations/made progress in areas identified in the previous assessment

Scores for each sub-indicator are taken from the MOPAN assessments and DAC Peer Reviews using the approach outlined above. We take the simple average of scores presented in the sub-indicators to find the overall score for this indicator.

Analysis based on: The average score on each sub-indicator; scores taken from MOPAN assessments or coded from the DAC Peer Reviews (chapter 6).

Source: OECD Peer Reviews and MOPAN assessments.

E3: Results-based management systems

Focusing on results from development engagements can support accountability, learning, and performance.

This indicator is a composite measure of the quality of results-based management systems, calculated by averaging provider scores on two sub-indicators:

1. **Results-oriented policies and strategies:** Expected results are clearly and systematically identified, based on a sound logic.
2. **Use of results information:** Results management and monitoring systems provide high-quality information that is used for planning, decision-making, programme management, and learning.

Scores for each sub-indicator are taken from the MOPAN assessments and DAC Peer Reviews using the approach outlined above. We take the simple average of scores presented in the sub-indicators to find the overall score for this indicator.

Analysis based on: The average score on each sub-indicator; scores taken from MOPAN assessments or coded from the DAC Peer Reviews (chapter 6).

Source: OECD Peer Reviews and MOPAN assessments.

References

Asian Development Bank, 2017. ADB Procurement Policy – Goods, Works, Nonconsulting and Consulting Services.

Benn, J., Rogerson, A. and Steensen, S., 2010. Getting closer to the core: Measuring country programmable aid. OECD Development Brief Issue 1. Paris: OECD.

Birdsall, N. and Kharas, H., 2010. Quality of Official Development Assistance Assessment. Brookings Institution and Center for Global Development.

Birdsall, N., Kharas, H. and Perakis, R., 2011. The Quality of Official Development Assistance Assessment 2009: Is Aid Quality Improving?. Brookings Institution and Center for Global Development.

Blampied, C., Mitchell, I. and Calleja, R., 2020. How We Can Score Development Agencies on Evaluation and Learning Systems. CGD blog, Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

Center for Global Development, 2018. Quality of Official Development Assistance: QuODA 2018 Methodology. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

Collier, P. and Dollar, D., 2002. Aid allocation and poverty reduction. European economic review, 46(8), pp.1475-1500.

Dalgaard, C.J. and Hansen, H., 2001. On aid, growth and good policies. Journal of development Studies, 37(6), pp.17-41.

Davies, R.B. and Klasen, S., 2019. Darlings and orphans: Interactions across donors in international aid. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 121(1), pp.243-277.

Dayton-Johnson, J. and Hoddinott, J., 2003. Aid, policies, and growth, redux. Unpublished manuscript, Dalhousie University, April.

Easterly, W., Levine, R. and Roodman, D., 2003. New data, new doubts: A comment on Burnside and Dollar's" aid, policies, and growth"(2000) (No. w9846). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Gavas, M., Hart, T., Mustapha, S. and Rogerson, A., 2017. Donor resilience index: Methodology. London: Overseas Development Institute.

Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2016. GPEDC Indicator 4: Revised Methodology.

Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, 2018. 2018 Monitoring Guide: For National Co-ordinators from Participating Governments.

Haider, H., 2018. Aid absorption: factors and measurements.

Hansen, H. and Tarp, F., 2001. Aid and growth regressions. Journal of development Economics, 64(2), pp.547-570.

Jepma, C. J., 1991. The tying of aid. Paris: OECD

Kharas, H. and Rogerson, A., 2012. Horizon 2025. Creative Destruction in the aid industry. Overseas Development Institute.

Knox D., 2016. Measuring aid to global public goods (GPGs): An approach to estimating funding for GPGs from providers of official development assistance. Development Initiatives Discussion Paper

Lea, N. and Dercon, S., 2016. Benchmarking aid allocation: Is the global and multilateral aid allocation poverty-focused?. Department for International Development Chief Economist's Office.

McGillivray, M., 1989. The allocation of aid among developing countries: A multi-donor analysis using a per capita aid index. World Development, 17(4), pp.561-568.

McKee, C., Blampied, C., Mitchell, I. and Rogerson, A., 2020. Revisiting Aid Effectiveness: A New Framework and Set of Measures for Assessing Aid "Quality" CGD Working Paper 524. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

Meeks, P., 2017. Unravelling Tied Aid: Why Aid must never be Tied to Donor Country Companies at the Expense of Women and Men living in Poverty. Brussels, Belgium: Eurodad.

Mitchell, I. and Hughes, S., 2020. Which Countries Miss Out in Global Aid Allocation?. CGD Notes, Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

Mitchell, I., Hughes, S., Ritchie, E., 2021. An Overview of the Impact of Proposed Cuts to UK Aid. CGD Notes, Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Joint Research Center, 2008. Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators: Methodology and User Guide. Paris: OECD.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and United Nations Development Programme, 2019. Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2019 Progress Report. OECD Publishing, Paris.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2020. States of Fragility 2020. OECD Publishing, Paris.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2021. 2020 Report on the DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA. Paris: OECD.

Price, G., 2004. India's aid dynamics: from recipient to donor?. London: Chatham House.

Publish What You Fund, 2020. 2020 Aid Transparency Index: Technical Paper.

Ravelo, J. L., 2012. India calls $459M UK aid 'peanuts'. Devex.

Robinson, L., Cichocka, B., Ritchie E. and Mitchell, I., 2020. The Commitment to Development Index: 2020 Edition: Methodological Overview Paper. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.

United Nations Economic and Social Council and Anderson, E., 2008. Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum: Allocating aid – practices and implications.

United Nations, 2015. Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development.

World Bank, 2017. Report from the Executive Directors of the International Development Association to the Board of Governors: Additions to IDA Resources - Eighteenth Replenishment (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

World Bank, 2020. Additions to IDA Resources: Nineteenth Replenishment - Ten Years to 2030: Growth, People, Resilience (English). Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

Annexes

Annex 1. Summary of QuODA changes since last edition

Dimension		Indicator	Change	Comparable?
Prioritisation	P1	ODA spent in partner countries	Now include humanitarian and food aid	c.f. ME4
	P2	Poverty focus	No change	c.f. ME1
	P3	Contributions to "orphans"	New	
	P4	Core multilateral contributions (share of)	No change	c.f. RB5
	P5	P5a. Allocations to fragile states (weighted share of)	New	
		P5b. Supporting selected public goods	New methodology includes bilateral and imputed multilateral spend	Not comparable, but replaces ME7
Ownership	O1	O1a. Share of interventions drawn from recipient country objectives	No change	c.f. FI4
		O1b. Share of evaluations planned with partner countries	No change	c.f. TL8
	O2	O2a. ODA recorded in partner country budgets (share of)	No change	c.f. FI3
		O2b. Use of partners' national finance systems	No change	c.f. FI5
	O3	O3a. Reliability – scheduled ODA recorded as received within period	No change	c.f. FI7
		O3b. Predictability – coverage of provider forward spending plans	No change	c.f. FI8
	O4	Partner feedback	New	
Transparency & Untying	T1	Aid reported in IATI (share)	New	
	T2	CRS coverage and comprehensiveness		Aggregation of TL3, TL4, TL5 & TL6
	T3	Timeliness of published projects (IATI and CRS)	New	
	T4	Untied ODA (official)	No change	Adjusted ME8
	T5	Untied ODA (contracts)	New	

Evaluation	E1	Evaluation systems	New	
	E2	Learning systems	New	
	E3	Results-based management systems	New	

Annex 2. Summary of QuODA indicators dropped since last edition

	QuODA 2018 indicator	Reason for dropping
RB1	Significance of aid relationships	Dropped fragmentation measures
RB2	Fragmentation across agencies	Dropped fragmentation measures
RB4	Median project size	Dropped fragmentation measures
TL1	Membership in IATI	Use measures of IATI coverage and timeliness, instead.
TL2	Making information on development funding publicly accessible	Replaced by GPEDC predictability indicator
ME2	Share of allocation to well-governed countries	Dropped governance measures
ME5	Focus/specialisation by recipient country	Evidence unclear on alignment with aid effectiveness
ME6	Focus/specialisation by sector	Evidence unclear on alignment with aid effectiveness
FI1	Share of aid to recipients' top development priorities	Survey data on priorities too imprecise to calculate alignment

Annex 3. Summary of hard-coded changes, by indicator and rationale

Dimension	Indicator	Hard-coded changes
Prioritisation	P1	None
	P2	None
	P3	None
	P4	None
	P5	None
Ownership	O1	NA's are used for providers without scores on GPEDC; CIF, GCF and Poland do not have results on any GPEDC indicator
		Slovakia receives a 0 on this indicator as a score provided by a single respondent. The zero value equates to an extremely high z-score which has a disproportionate weight on Slovakia's score. As a result, we assign an "NA" for Slovakia's performance for this measure.
	O2	NA's are used for providers without scores on GPEDC.
	O3	NA's are used for providers without scores on GPEDC.
	O4	NA's are used for providers without scores on GPEDC
Transparency & Untying	T1	Coverage ratios are capped at 100% for providers who have reported more ODA and other official flows to IATI than to the OECD. For 2019 this includes: IDA (102%), IFAD (108%), Sweden (108%), and UNDP (326%).
	T2	None
	T3	T3a: The OECD reports that the CRS data for the IMF is downloaded directly from the IMF website. We award the IMF a score of "3" on the assumption that the IMF can't report late to the OECD if the data is downloadable.
	T4	Asian Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank is assigned the equivalent to the lowest value recorded for DAC providers due to evidence that it ties procurement to member countries. IsDB given mean percentage as 'sometimes' bidding is restricted to member countries.
	T5	EU Institutions do not have data on the value of contracts awarded to domestic suppliers as it is not a country, we instead calculate the value of contracts for the EU Institutions as the sum of contracts won by EU member countries.
		Netherlands, Norway, and Slovakia did not report contracts data to the OECD in 2017-2018. They are awarded the equivalent of the worst score as a penalty.
		Ireland reports not allocating contracts in 2017-2018 and is awarded a "no score".
Evaluation	E1	None
	E2	None
	E3	None

Annex 4. Technical methodology for QuODA's new P3 indicator

P3 is a newly developed indicator for this edition of QuODA. It aims to measure which providers support those neglected by others. To do so, it employs an idea originally proposed by Paddy Carter to capture the extent to which each provider's own aid moves the global distribution of CPA towards or away from an optimal allocation. By rewarding aid directed towards under-aided "orphans"—those countries neglected by the global system whose actual CPA receipts are lower than the ideal— and penalising aid directed towards over-aided "darlings"—those countries whose actual CPA receipts exceed the ideal.

Underlying this indicator is an explicit value-judgement of what the optimal global aid allocation should look like. We considered several options including simple metrics of aid per person in extreme poverty but settled on a more sophisticated option[61]. Performance-Based Allocation (PBA) models are a common method used by providers to inform their aid allocation decisions; balancing the competing criteria of partner country need and their ability to make effective use of aid.[62] The World Bank makes use of one of the most widely recognised and transparent PBA models as part of its resource allocation mechanism for the International Development Association (IDA). Due to its intuitive simplicity, wide recognition, and broad buy-in, [63] an adjusted version of the IDA model has therefore been used in this indicator, with modifications made to expand its country coverage.

Among eligible countries, the IDA model allocates resources directly proportional to population size, decreasing with GNI per capita, and increasing with Country Performance Ratings (CPR). A country's level of GNI per capita (using the Atlas method) proxies for its need; whilst CPR scores capture the World Bank's assessment of a country's policy and institutional framework that facilities the effective use of aid.[64] The model takes an explicit functional form (see Equation 1) with exponents placed over GNI per capita and CPR, calibrated to balance the relative weights of country need and performance.[65]

Several adjustments have been made to the IDA model in order to expand its country coverage, since the official version uses a low GNI per capita eligibility threshold which excludes many ODA-eligible countries from the allocation exercise. These adjustments are laid out below:

1) **Raising the income graduation threshold**. In 2019 the IDA operational cut-off was a GNI per capita of US$ 1,185 (using the Atlas method). This includes just 30 countries,[66] out of a total of 143 ODA-eligible countries in 2019.[67] To extend the country coverage of the IDA model, we raise the GNI per capita threshold to US$ 4,045, at which point countries graduate from receiving aid. This cut-off includes all 77 countries of low- and lower-middle income status (LICs and LMICs) in 2019.[68]

2) **Greater weight placed on country need**. When raising the IDA income eligibility cut-off to include all LMICs, it is poorer countries which see the largest absolute decline in their implied optimal

---

[61] For example, see https://www.cgdev.org/publication/which-countries-miss-out-global-aid-allocation

[62] United Nations Economic and Social Council and Anderson (2008)

[63] As the United Nations Economic and Social Council and Anderson (2008, p.21) comment in a review, "The best-known PBA model is that used by the World Bank IDA."

Additionally, as most international providers allocate resources through IDA, this model can be said to command a degree of international support. Twenty-nine of the current thirty DAC members contributed to the IDA19 replenishment (excluding only the EU). See: https://ida.worldbank.org/about/contributor-countries

[64] CPR scores are primarily based upon the World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which covers the four broad areas of economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions. Out of these, it is primarily determined by the public sector management cluster (which has a relative weight of 68%). Alongside CPIA, CPR is also partially based upon IDA's portfolio performance ratings (with a minor weight of 8%), measuring the percentage of problem projects in each country. See Annex 2 of World Bank (2020).

[65] See Annex 2 of World Bank (2017) and Annex 2 of World Bank (2020).

[66] Note that in practice IDA also lends to countries (e.g. small island states) with an income level above its operational cut-off based upon creditworthiness criteria.

[67] See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/DAC-List-of-ODA-Recipients-for-reporting-2018-and-2019-flows.pdf

[68] See: https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/site-content/OGHIST.xls

allocations.[69] In order to maintain sufficient allocations to partner countries with the lowest incomes, greater weight must be placed on country need. Following Lea & Dercon (2016),[70] we do so by adjusting the exponent over GNI per capita to -1 (c.f. official IDA model exponent of -0.125).

3) **Impute missing CPR values.** The IDA model uses Country Performance Ratings (CPR) as one of its key inputs; but this measure is only calculated by the World Bank for IDA-eligible countries. We therefore impute missing CPR data by predicting their values based on two of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). Regressing observed 2018 CPR scores on the WGI Government Effectiveness indicator and WGI Regulatory Quality indicator yields a statistically significant ($p<0.001$ for both variables) positive relationship with an R^2 of 0.83. This relationship allows us to impute missing CPR data for countries using predicted values based on their WGI scores.[71]

4) **Cap ODA dependency ratios.** The IDA model is designed to allocate just IDA resources. Consequently, applying its optimal aid allocations (in percentage terms) to the larger total global aid budget can imply that some countries receive too much aid relative to their economic size. We therefore cap optimal aid allocations at 30 percent of any partner country's GNI as a reasonable limit on absorptive capacity.[72]

5) **Cap aid to India.** Due to its large population size and comparatively high CPR score, India is prescribed 40 percent of global aid by the IDA model (once adjusted by the above four modifications).[73] Yet the Government of India (GoI) has been transitioning away from recipient status, limiting its bilateral providers, refusing tied resources, and commencing its own aid programme,[74] alongside notably rejecting some forms of foreign assistance.[75] We therefore infer that India currently absorbs as much CPA as the GoI desires, and cap its optimal allocation at 5 percent of global CPA: its current actual level.[76] Since CPA only measures government-to-government spending, this cap does not penalise additional assistance channelled via NGOs.

The functional form of the adjusted IDA model used to determine the optimal allocation of global ODA for QuODA's P3 indicator is presented below. Each eligible partner country, denoted by subscript r, is first assigned a score based on equation (1).[77] Once the scores for all eligible partners are calculated, the optimal CPA allocation for each country (as a proportion of total global CPA) can be calculated using equation (2).

$$Adjusted\ IDA\ Score_r = Population_r \times GNI\ per\ capita_r^{-1} \times Country\ Performance\ Ranking_r^3 \qquad (1)$$

---

[69] As the income threshold is raised, more countries become eligible to receive aid. In the IDA model, if these additional countries are collectively allocated x percentage points (pp) of world aid, then all previously eligible countries now receive (100-x)% of their previous allocations. This constant relative cut implies the largest absolute cuts for the poorest countries, since *all else equal* poorer countries are allocated a greater share of world aid (and cutting (100-x)% of a larger allocation implies a greater absolute fall in aid than a does a similar relative cut of (100-x)% to a smaller initial allocation).

For example, take two recipient countries: one being poorer and the other richer, but otherwise similar. Suppose the IDA model allocates the poorer country 60 percentage points (pp) of aid, and the richer country 40pp. Then suppose that the income eligibility threshold is raised, so that an even richer third country now receives a positive aid allocation of 30pp. This implies that both of the original two countries shoulder the same proportional cut of 30% to their allocated shares of total aid. Of the original two recipients, the poorer country now receives 42pp of global aid (=(100%-30%)*60pp), and the richer one receives 28pp (=(100%-30%)*40pp). Whilst both countries receive an equal proportionate cut of 30%, this is larger in an absolute sense for the poorest country (60pp-42pp=18pp) rather than the richer country (40pp-28pp=12pp).

[70] Lea and Dercon (2016)

[71] Conceptually, the WGI Government Effectiveness indicator measures "perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies." The Regulatory Quality indicator "captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development." In combination these two WGI indicators therefore proxy for both the state capacity and enabling environment dimensions of CPR.

[72] For an overview, see Haider (2018).

[73] Note that even when absorbing 40% of global aid, India's aid dependency ratio would not exceed 3% of GNI.

[74] Price (2004)

[75] For example, see Ravelo (2012): https://www.devex.com/news/india-calls-459m-uk-aid-peanuts-77419

[76] In 2018 (the last year for which official CPA statistics are currently available) India received 5.0% of global CPA (more than any other individual country). This share has been stable, too, averaging 5.2% over the five-year period 2014-18.
See: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CPA

[77] Note that in placing an exponent of three over CPR scores, equation (1) follows the official IDA model used in 2019 and 2018. However, as explained above, this model has been adjusted in order to expand its country coverage; and this has involved increasing the exponent above GNI per capita from the official value of -0.125 to the adjusted value of -1.

$$Optimal\ Global\ Aid\ Allocation_r = \frac{Adjusted\ IDA\ Score_r}{\sum_{r=1}^{R} Adjusted\ IDA\ Score_r} \tag{2}$$

Once equation (2) has been used to determine optimal CPA allocations from the adjusted IDA model, QuODA's P3 indicator can be calculated. For P3, scores are assigned to each provider based upon the change they cause in the sum of squared gaps between the global actual and optimal aid allocation for each partner country, adjusted by the provider's share of global CPA.

The following formula demonstrate how provider scores are calculated from gross disbursements of CPA[78] and the optimal aid allocation model. Subscript r denotes recipient country, and subscript d denotes donor country.

$$P3\ Score_d$$
$$= \frac{\left(\left(\sum_{r=1}^{R}\left(\left(\frac{(\sum_{d=1}^{D} CPA_{d,r}) - CPA_{d,r}}{(\sum_{d=1}^{D}\sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}) - \sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}}\right) - Optimal\ Global\ Aid\ Allocation_r\right)^2\right) - \left(\sum_{r=1}^{R}\left(\left(\frac{\sum_{d=1}^{D} CPA_{d,r}}{\sum_{d=1}^{D}\sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}}\right) - Optimal\ Global\ Aid\ Allocation_r\right)^2\right)\right)}{\left(\frac{\sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}}{\sum_{d=1}^{D}\sum_{r=1}^{R} CPA_{d,r}}\right)} \tag{3}$$

Z-scores of each provider's P3 score are then taken to arrive at the final P3 indicator values.

---

[78] By excluding certain expenditures from ODA, CPA better captures predictable, cross-border, government-to-government transfers that can be used by partners to support their development. See Benn et al. (2010).

Annex 5. List of GPG-related CRS purpose and channel codes used in indicator P5b

CRS purpose codes related to the provision of GPGs

GPG theme	CRS purpose code	CRS purpose code description
Communicable disease	12250	Infectious disease control
	12262	Malaria control
	12263	Tuberculosis control
	13040	STD control inc. HIV/AIDS
Climate change mitigation	23183	Energy conservation and demand-side efficiency
	23210	Energy generation, renewable sources - multiple technologies
	23220	Hydro-electric power plants
	23230	Solar energy
	23240	Wind energy
	23250	Marine energy
	23260	Geothermal energy
	23270	Biofuel-fired power plants
	23510	Nuclear energy electric power plants
Environmental sustainability	14015	Water resources conservation
	14040	River basins development
	31310	Fishery policy and admin. management
	41010	Environmental policy and admin. management
	41020	Biosphere protection
	41030	Biodiversity
	41040	Site preservation
	41081	Environmental education/training
	41082	Environmental research
Trade	33110	Trade policy and admin. management
	33120	Trade facilitation
	33130	Regional trade agreements
	33140	Multilateral trade negotiations
	33150	Trade-related adjustment
	33181	Trade education/training

Peace & security	15210	Security system management and reform
	15220	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
	15230	Participation in international peacekeeping operations
	15240	Reintegration and SALW control
Research & knowledge	11182	Educational research
	12182	Medical research
	23181	Energy research
	31182	Agricultural research
	31282	Forestry research
	31382	Fishery research
	32182	Technological research and development
	43082	Research/scientific institutions
Transparency, anti-corruption & international crime	15113	Anti-corruption organisations
	16063	Narcotics control

CRS channel codes related to the provision of GPGs

Channel code	Channel name	Type of public good	Theme/sector (primary)
41316	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	GPG	Climate change mitigation
41317	Green Climate Fund	GPG	Climate change mitigation
47136	Global Green Growth Institute	GPG	Climate change mitigation
47144	International Renewable Energy Agency	GPG	Climate change mitigation
21020	International HIV/AIDS Alliance	GPG	Communicable disease
30005	International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	GPG	Communicable disease
30006	International Partnership on Microbicides	GPG	Communicable disease
31006	Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations	GPG	Communicable disease
41110	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS	GPG	Communicable disease
41143	World Health Organization - core voluntary contributions account	GPG	Communicable disease
41307	World Health Organization - assessed contributions	GPG	Communicable disease
47045	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	GPG	Communicable disease
47053	International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh	GPG	Communicable disease
47074	International Vaccine Institute	GPG	Communicable disease
47083	Pan-American Health Organization	RPG	Communicable disease
47122	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	GPG	Communicable disease
21021	International Institute for Environment and Development	GPG	Environmental sustainability
21062	The Nature Conservancy	GPG	Environmental sustainability
21063	Conservation International	GPG	Environmental sustainability
30011	International Union for the Conservation of Nature	GPG	Environmental sustainability

41116	United Nations Environment Programme	GPG	Environmental sustainability
47015	CGIAR Fund	GPG	Food supply security
51001	International Food Policy Research Institute	GPG	Food supply security
41144	International Labour Organization - Regular Budget Supplementary Account	GPG	Norms and standards
41302	International Labour Organization - Assessed Contributions	GPG	Norms and standards
41319	World Tourism Organization	GPG	Norms and standards
21038	International Alert	IS	Peace & security
21042	International Peacebuilding Alliance	IS	Peace & security
41128	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime	IS	Peace & security
41310	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations	IS	Peace & security
47003	Association of South East Asian Nations: Economic Co-operation	RPG	Regional integration & cooperation
47005	African Union (excluding peacekeeping facilities)	RPG	Regional integration & cooperation
47011	Caribbean Community Secretariat	RPG	Regional integration & cooperation
47034	Economic Community of West African States	RPG	Regional integration & cooperation
47079	Organization of American States	RPG	Regional integration & cooperation
47087	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat	RPG	Regional integration & cooperation
47089	Southern African Development Community	RPG	Regional integration & cooperation
47096	Secretariat of the Pacific Community	RPG	Regional integration & cooperation
21039	International Institute for Sustainable Development	GPG	Research & knowledge
41304	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation	GPG	Research & knowledge
41309	World Meteorological Organization	GPG	Research & knowledge

47020	International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre	GPG	Research & knowledge
47021	International Potato Centre	GPG	Research & knowledge
47054	International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology	RPG	Research & knowledge
47062	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture	GPG	Research & knowledge
47063	International Livestock Research Institute	GPG	Research & knowledge
47104	WorldFish Centre	GPG	Research & knowledge
45001	World Trade Organization - International Trade Centre	GPG	Trade
21033	Transparency International	IS	Transparency, anti-corruption and international crime

Annex 6. Relationship between ownership and fragility

One area of feedback on this revised edition of QuODA related to whether measures of "ownership" were appropriate given the need to focus on fragile states where it may be necessary to work in a way that the recipient government has less ownership. Following this feedback, we intended to adjust ownership measures according to the fragility of the recipient.

To explore this, we tested the relationship between a sample of the GPEDC indicators used in QuODA as proxies of "ownership" and the fragility of partner countries to identify whether providers that worked primarily in fragile states would be penalized by our selection of QuODA indicators. In each case, we ran a simple correlation between the GPEDC indicator score given by each partner to each provider and two proxies for "fragility": (1) the OECD's fragility scores (2017) based on its multidimensional fragility framework,[79] and (2) the World Bank's CPIA scores for 2017, which measure institutional quality and inform the World Bank's Harmonized List of Fragile Situations.[80] We used the CPIA rather than the World Bank's Harmonized List of Fragile Situations because the CPIA data is continuous and covers a larger group of countries, making it easier to assess the relationship between ownership scores and institutional quality. This means that our test does not capture countries included in the World Bank's Harmonized List of Fragile Situations which are classified as fragile due to the presence of a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission over the last three years. 2017 data is used in all cases to match the latest year of the GPEDC survey.

We examine the relationship between fragility and four of the GPEDC indicators included in QuODA (O1a, O1b, O2a, O2b). In each case, providers working in fragile states could perform worse on these indicators to the degree that it is more difficult to ensure state ownership or utilize country systems if institutional capacity is weak.[81] For each indicator, we present two scatter plots of the dyadic GPEDC data for the specified indicator and the relevant fragility measure. Correlations are presented in Table 1; in both cases, lower fragility scores indicate worse performance. On average, the correlations with CPIA show a stronger relationship. However, CPIA covers IDA eligible countries (low-income) only, which means that many countries responding to GPEDC do not have CPIA data available and are excluded from the figures below.

### QuODA Indicator O1a (GPEDC Indicator 1a.1)

Figure 1a: O1a scores and CPIA	Figure 1b: O1a scores and OECD fragility

Note: Figures use CPIA and OECD data for 2017. OECD data is the "Aggeagte PC1" variable, which appears to be the overall scores driving the OECD fragility ranking.

---

[79] OECD's multidimensional fragility framework is outlined in its *States of Fragility* report (OECD, 2020). The data was accessed from GitHub in July, 2020 and is available from: https://github.com/githubIEP/oecd-sfr-2018

[80] CPIA data was accessed in July 2020 from: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/country-policy-and-institutional-assessment

[81] See McKee et al. (2020) for more.

# QuODA Indictor O1b (GPEDC Indicator 1a.4)

Figure 2a: O1b scores and CPIA

y = 0.0215x + 0.5193
R² = 0.0003

Figure 2b: O1b scores and OECD fragility

y = 0.0045x + 0.6021
R² = 0.0002

Note: Figures use CPIA and OECD data for 2017. OECD data is the "Aggreagte PC1" variable, which appears to be the overall scores driving the OECD fragility ranking.

QuODA Indictor O2a (GPEDC Indicator 6.1)

Figure 3a: O2a scores and CPIA

y = 0.1296x - 0.2131
R² = 0.0276

Figure 3b: O2a scores and OECD fragility

y = -0.0174x + 0.1618
R² = 0.0047

Note: Figures use CPIA and OECD data for 2017. OECD data is the "Aggreagte PC1" variable, which appears to be the overall scores driving the OECD fragility ranking.

QuODA Indictor O2b (GPEDC Indicator 9b)

Figure 4a: O2b scores and CPIA

y = 0.1072x - 0.1745
R² = 0.0251

Figure 4b: O2b scores and OECD fragility

y = -0.005x + 0.1665
R² = 0.0005

Note: Figures use CPIA and OECD data for 2017. OECD data is the "Aggreagte PC1" variable, which appears to be the overall scores driving the OECD fragility ranking.

Table 1. Correlations of GPEDC indicator scores and fragility measures

GPEDC Indicator	CPIA	OECD
1a.1	18.8%	-3%
1a.4	1.9%	1.3%
6.1	-4.5%	-15.4%
9b	16.4%	-4.9%

Annex 7. List of IATI reporting organisations used in indicator T1, matched to list of QuODA providers

Provider code	QuODA provider	IATI organisation identifier	IATI publisher
AFDF	African Development Fund	46002	African Development Bank Group[82]
AFESD	Arab Fund	NA	NA
ASDB	Asian Development Bank	46004	Asian Development Bank[83]
AUS	Australia	AU-5	Australia - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
AUT	Austria	NA	NA
BEL	Belgium	BE-BCE_KBO-0264814354	Belgian development agency (Enabel)
		XM-DAC-2-10	Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of Belgium
CAN	Canada	CA-3	Global Affairs Canada
		CA-4	Department of Finance Canada
		XM-DAC-301-2	Canada - International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
CHE	Switzerland	CH-4	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
CIF	Climate Investment Funds	47135	Climate Investment Funds
CZE	Czechia	NA	NA
DEU	Germany	DE-1	Germany - Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)

---

[82] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is the African Development Fund
[83] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is the Asian Development Bank

DNK	Denmark	XM-DAC-3-1	Denmark - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida
ESP	Spain	ES-DIR3-E04585801	Spain - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
		ES-DIR3-EA0035768	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID)
EUI	EU Institutions	XI-IATI-EC_DEVCO	European Commission - Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO)[84]
		XI-IATI-EC_ECHO	European Commission - Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO)
		XI-IATI-EC_NEAR	European Commission - Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR)
		XI-IATI-EC_FPI	European Commission - Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI)
		XM-DAC-918-3	European Investment Bank
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	XM-DAC-41301	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)[85]
FIN	Finland	FI-3	Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
FRA	France	FR-3	Agence Française de Développement (AFD)
		FR-6	France - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	47122	Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance[86]
GBR	United Kingdom	GB-GOV-1	UK - Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)
		GB-GOV-2	UK - HM Treasury
		GB-GOV-6	UK - Home Office

---

[84] In January 2021, DEVCO was renamed "INTPA"; at the time of writing, the IATI data used referred to "DEVCO".
[85] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is the Food and Agriculture Organization
[86] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance

		GB-GOV-7	UK - Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (Defra)
		GB-GOV-8	UK - Ministry of Defence (MOD)
		GB-9	UK - Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)
		GB-GOV-10	UK - Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC)
		GB-GOV-12	UK - Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS)
		GB-GOV-13	UK - Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS)
		GB-GOV-14	UK Department for Education (DfE)
		GB-GOV-15	UK - Department for International Trade (DIT)
		GB-GOV-21	UK - Scottish Government
		GB-GOV-50	UK - Prosperity Fund
		GB-GOV-52	UK - Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)
GCF	Green Climate Fund	NA	NA
GEF	Global Environment Facility	XI-BRIDGE-6385676864	Global Environment Facility[87]
GLF	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	47045	The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria[88]
GRC	Greece	NA	NA
HUN	Hungary	NA	NA
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank	XI-IATI-IADB	Inter-American Development Bank[89]
IDA	International Development Association	44000	World Bank Group[90]

---

[87] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is the Global Environment Facility
[88] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
[89] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is the Inter-American Development Bank
[90] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation and the transaction provider organisation is the International Development Association

IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development	XM-DAC-41108	International Fund for Agricultural Development[91]
ILO	International Labour Organization	XM-DAC-41302	International Labour Organisation (ILO)[92]
IMF	International Monetary Fund (Concessional Trust Funds)	XM-DAC-43000	International Monetary Fund
IRL	Ireland	XM-DAC-21-1	Ireland - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
ISDB	Islamic Development Bank	NA	NA
ISL	Iceland	NA	NA
ITA	Italy	XM-DAC-6-4	Italian Agency for Cooperation and Development (AICS)
JPN	Japan	XM-DAC-701-2	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)
		XM-DAC-701-8	Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
KOR	Korea	KR-GOV-021	The Export-Import Bank of Korea
LUX	Luxembourg	NA	NA
NLD	Netherlands	XM-DAC-7	Netherlands - Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGIS)
NOR	Norway	NO-BRC-971277882	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad)
NZL	New Zealand	NZ-1	New Zealand - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT)
OFID	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for International Development	XI-IATI-OFID	The OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)
POL	Poland	NA	NA
PRT	Portugal	NA	NA
SVK	Slovakia	XM-DAC-69-1	Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Slovakia

[91] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is the International Fund for Agricultural Development
[92] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is the International Labour Organization

SVN	Slovenia	XM-DAC-61-2	Slovenia - Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SWE	Sweden	SE-0	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	XM-DAC-41114	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)[93]
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund	XM-DAC-41122	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
USA	United States	US-USAGOV	The Federal Government of the United States
		US-GOV-1	United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
		US-18	United States - Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
WHO	World Health Organization	XM-DAC-928	World Health Organization[94]

---

[93] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is the United Nations Development Programme
[94] Including only transactions where the participating funding organisation is Assessed Contributions or Core Voluntary Contributions

Annex 8. Evidence of multilateral tying

Agency	Procurement policy	Evidence of partial tying
African Development Fund	"[Paragraph A2.1.3:] On the other hand, the African Development Fund (ADF) permits universal procurement; i.e. individuals and firms from all countries worldwide may offer goods, works and services under ADF-financed projects."	No (fund only)
Arab Fund (AFESD)	"The Funds, therefore, normally require the Borrowers to procure the goods or to contract for the execution of works or services (with the exception of consultancy services*) through international competitive bidding open to suppliers and contractors from all countries of the world not disqualified in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1-3) of these Guidelines" (p. 5).	No
Asian Development Bank	"[Paragraph 7:] Except in any case in which the Board of Directors determines otherwise, (i) loans or grants from Special Funds resources can be used only for procurement of goods, works, and services produced in, and supplied from, developed member countries that have contributed to such resources or developing member countries; and (ii) loans or grants from ADB's ordinary capital resources or ADB-administered funds can be used only for procurement of goods, works, and services produced in, and supplied from, member countries."	Yes
Climate Investment Funds	CIF is composed of two multi-donor trust funds – Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund. Documents available on the CIF website suggest that both funds allocate spending primarily to MDBs, and rely on their policies and procedures in managing the activities funded.	No
EU Institutions	Degree of tying reporting to the OECD's CRS	Yes
Food and Agriculture Organization	"On January 1st 2010, the Organization adopted a revised version of the procurement policy (MS 502). It is based on the fundamental principles of Best Value for Money, fairness, transparency, economy and effectiveness. MS502 is also designed to: • promote standardization and the use of Framework Agreements, when appropriate, to maximize efficient use of resources; • give due consideration to the importance of attaining an equitable international distribution of procurement sources while encouraging developing and emerging economies and supporting capacity building in beneficiary countries, particularly in emergency and post-emergency rehabilitative situations; • favour cooperation with other entities of the United Nations system, when appropriate; and • promote a competitive market by favouring procurement from the private sector over procurement from government entities, government controlled enterprises or Vendors receiving government subsidies, except when the latter is the only viable option or would result in substantial benefit to the Organization or to the beneficiaries of its technical cooperation activities" (FAO, 2021)	No
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	"Procurement of goods and services will be carried out to maximise competition to the greatest extent practicable and will be open to as many eligible bidders as is practicable in order to ensure effective competition and obtain best value for money and long-term	No

	sustainability." [Section 2.3, p. 5/7) where the list of potential ineligibility criteria only covers due-diligence checks, non-performance & fraud/corruption i.e. no tying]	
Global Environment Facility	GEF requires partner agencies to maintain minimum fiduciary standards, which includes that "Specific GEF Partner Agency policies and guidelines promote economy, efficiency, transparency and fairness in procurement through written standards and procedures that specify procurement requirements, accountability, and authority to take procurement actions. As a minimum, these policies and guidelines provide for: - open competition and define the situations in which other less competitive methods can be used; and - wide participation through publication of business opportunities; descriptive bid/proposal documents that disclose the evaluation criteria to be used; neutral and broad specifications; non-discriminatory participation and selection principles; and sufficient time to submit bids or proposals…" (p. 7).	No
Global Fund	"[Paragraph 2.7:] Procurement shall be carried out on a competitive basis to the maximum practical extent"	No
Green Climate Fund*	"4.2 To ensure an adequate, fair and equal opportunity for eligible suppliers or providers to compete for contracts, the Fund will adopt the most competitive procurement procedure applicable to a particular purchasing situation and observe transparency and fairness throughout the procurement process" (p. 3)	No
IFAD	"[Paragraph 3.2.1:] In order to ensure that procurement is carried out only from eligible and reliable vendors, Procurement ADM monitors and reviews the Vendor Registration submissions in UNGM and accepts or rejects them on the basis of the compliance with the following vendor eligibility criteria: i) Vendor is incorporated and legally registered under the laws of a Member State of IFAD; ii) Vendor has accepted the UN Supplier Code of Conduct; iii) Vendor proposes goods, services or works that may be needed in the future."	No
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	The IMF applies the basic principles of fair competition and equal treatment rigorously. This helps to ensure that the IMF obtains the best value by encouraging active participation by qualified suppliers, while avoiding preferential or discriminatory activities. IMF procurement activities adhere to the highest ethical standards, and our suppliers are expected to conduct business in a similar fashion. The IMF does not follow the procurement rules and regulations of the US Government. (see IMF Procurement Guide for Suppliers)	No
Inter-American Development Bank	"Funds from the Bank loans can be used only for the payment of goods, works, and services contracted with firms or individuals from Bank member countries. In the case of goods, their origin shall be from Bank member countries. Individuals or firms from other countries shall not be eligible to participate in contracts to be financed in whole or in part from Bank loans. Any other conditions for participation shall be limited to those that are essential to ensure the firm's capability to fulfill the contract in question." (p. 3). **"**Funds from Bank loans can be used only for payment of services rendered by individuals or firms from member countries of the Bank. Individuals or firms from other countries shall be ineligible to participate in contracts to be financed in whole or in part from Bank loans. Any other conditions for participation shall be limited to	Yes

	those that are essential to ensure the firm's capability to fulfil the contract in question" (p. 4).	
International Development Association	"[Paragraph 3.21:] The Bank permits eligible firms and individuals from all countries to offer Goods, Works, Non-consulting Services, and Consulting Services for Bank-financed projects."	No
Islamic Development Bank	"[Paragraph 1.9v:] IsDB normally requires Beneficiaries to obtain Goods, Works and/or related services through International Competitive Bidding (ICB), in Accordance with its eligibility rules. However, depending on the project's requirements, other methods of procurement may be allowed as long as VfM, Fit-for-Purpose and the core procurement principles are respected" (p. 2)	Partial
OPEC Fund for International Development	"Accordingly, OFID requires its recipients to obtain goods and services, as a general rule, on an international competitive bidding basis" (p. 5). "'International competitive bidding'," as used in these guidelines, has the purpose of affording to prospective bidders from all countries adequate notification of a recipient's requirements and of providing all bidders an equal opportunity to bid on the necessary goods or works, subject to appropriate preferences for goods and services from developing countries according to Para. 3.9 of these guidelines. In connection with any contract to be financed by OFID, as a general rule, OFID does not permit a recipient to deny prequalification, if required, to a firm for reasons unrelated to its capacity to supply the goods and services in question; nor does it permit a recipient to disqualify any bidder for such reasons." (p. 6)	No
UNDP	"[Paragraphs 8:}: UNDP does not accept the restriction of awards to exclusive contractors or countries, unless explicitly mentioned in a donor agreement approved by the Chief Procurement Officer." (p. 2)	No
UNICEF	"Uses primarily competitive tendering for all procurement".	No
World Health Organization	"As a public organization, WHO must strictly adhere to the Organization financial rules and regulations, which mandate that contracts be awarded through a competitive process, obtaining bids through formal tenders or through pre-qualified suppliers for specialized items. To ensure consistency across all Major offices, WHO uses standard templates for bidding documents, available in English and French in some Regions." WHO website.	No

Annex 9. Evaluation dimension – detailed indicator framework

Framework, indicators, and sources for assessing donor evaluation, learning, and results-based management indicators

Indicator	Proposed sub-indicator	DAC Peer Review Reference Guide (2019-20), *Paraphrased*	MOPAN 3.0 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
1. Evaluation system (Average of sub-indicator scores – score out of 4)	(a) **Evaluation policy** with defined roles and responsibilities.	6.2 An evaluation policy with clearly defined roles and responsibilities	8.2 Element 1: An evaluation policy describes the principles to ensure coverage, quality and use of findings, including in decentralised evaluations 8.2 Element 2: The policy/an evaluation manual guides the implementation of the different categories of evaluations, such as strategic, thematic, corporate level evaluations, as well as decentralized evaluations 8.2 Element 5: Evidence from sample countries demonstrate that the policy is being implemented
	(b) There is a dedicated **overall evaluation plan and budget** to allow consistent coverage of activities.	6.2 There is an overall evaluation plan and dedicated budget for the evaluation of development assistance activities to ensure coverage	8.1 Element 4: A separate budget line (approved by the Governing Body) ensures budgetary independence 8.1 Element 5: The central evaluation programme is fully funded by core funds 8.2 Element 3: A prioritised and funded evaluation plan covering the organisation's planning and budgeting cycle is available

Indicator	Proposed sub-indicator	DAC Peer Review Reference Guide (2019-20), *Paraphrased*	MOPAN 3.0 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
	Evaluation function is: (c) **independent and impartial**	6.2 The evaluation process is impartial and independent from the process concerned with policymaking and the delivery of development assistance	8.1 Element 1: Evaluation function is independent from other management functions 8.1 Element 3: evaluation office has full discretion in deciding the evaluation programme 8.1 Element 7: Evaluators are able to conduct their work throughout the evaluation without undue interference by those involved in implementing the unit of analysis being evaluated
	(d) with sufficient **expertise** and systems in place to ensure quality.	6.2 There is an evaluation function with sufficient expertise to ensure quality	8.1 Element 2: Head of evaluation reports directly to the Governing Body of the organisation 8.1 Element 6: Evaluations are submitted directly for consideration at the appropriate level of decision-making pertaining to the subject of evaluation 8.3 Systems applied to ensure the quality of evaluations
2. Institutional learning (Average of sub-indicator scores – score out of 4)	(a) Programme management and *accountability systems ensure follow-up* on recommendations and learning.	6.3 Feedback mechanisms that involve all parties and link to the overall programme management and accountability systems to ensure follow-up on recommendations and learning	8.6 Clear accountability system ensures responses and follow-up to and use of evaluation recommendations
	(b) A *knowledge management system* based on results and evidence is used as a forward-looking management tool; there	6.3 Knowledge management system used across development cooperation system as a forward-looking management tool –	8.7 Uptake of lessons learned and best practices from evaluations

Indicator	Proposed sub-indicator	DAC Peer Review Reference Guide (2019-20), *Paraphrased*	MOPAN 3.0 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
	is *uptake of lessons and best practices*.	building on results and evidence for learning and analysis	
	(c) The donor has *implemented past recommendations / made progress* in areas identified as weak in the previous assessment.	Share of recommendations from the previous Peer Review that have been implemented. Score as: Fully implemented (weighted 1); partially implemented (weighted 0.5); or not implemented (weighted zero), added together to provide a single composite %.[95]	Assessment of progress made on previously identified weaknesses in the 'Performance Journey' narrative section of MOPAN Review. *Score using the usual four-part rating system.* *This excludes multilaterals that have had only one MOPAN Review to date.*[96]
3. Results-based management (Average of sub-indicator scores – score out of 4)	(a) Expected results are *clearly and systematically identified*, based on a *sound logic*	6.1 States the objectives of development cooperation policies and programmes in terms that can be measured and assessed, and makes explicit reference to the achievement of development results with a clearly articulated chain of expected results from output to impact	7.2 Element 1: Organisation-wide plans and strategies include results frameworks 7.2 Element 2: Clear linkages exist between the different layers of the results framework, from project through to country and corporate level 7.3 Element 1: Targets and indicators are adequate to capture causal pathways between interventions and the outcomes that contribute to higher order objectives 7.3 Element 2: Indicators are relevant to the expected result to enable measurement of the degree of goal achievement

[95] This measure excludes five DAC members that have had only one Peer Review: Czechia, Iceland, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In these cases, it will be treated as a missing data point, and simply calculate the learning sub-score based on two inputs rather than three.
[96] The Global Fund is excluded since there has been only one MOPAN review to date. Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is included even though there has only been one MOPAN review to date, the narrative performance journey relates to 'Overall Performance Study' OPS5.

Indicator	Proposed sub-indicator	DAC Peer Review Reference Guide (2019-20), *Paraphrased*	MOPAN 3.0 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
	(b) Results measurement and monitoring systems *provide high-quality information that is used* for planning, decision-making, programme management, and learning	6.1 Results measurement provides information that is used for learning and improving programme management	7.4 Element 2: Monitoring systems generate data at output and outcome level of the results chain 7.4 Element 5: A system for ensuring data quality exists 7.4 Element 6: Data adequately captures key corporate results 7.5 Performance data transparently applied in planning and decision-making

Scoring system

Each indicator would receive a score of between 0 and 4. To calculate this:

For multilaterals, we will use the score given for each micro-indicator or element(s) in their MOPAN review, or the average of two or more scores where relevant. MOPAN's four-part rating system is as follows:
- Highly satisfactory (3.01 – 4)
- Satisfactory (2.01 – 3)
- Unsatisfactory (1.01 – 2)
- Highly unsatisfactory (0 – 1)

The scoring criteria for each mirco-element or indicator that underpin the rating above is judged as follows:
- 4 = Element is fully implemented/implemented in all cases
- 3 = Element is substantially implemented/implemented in the majority of cases
- 2 = Element is partially implemented/implemented in some cases
- 1 = Element is present, but not implemented/implemented in zero cases
- 0 = Element is not present

For OECD DAC Reviews, we will award scores ourselves using the same scoring criteria and categorisation as used by MOPAN, to allow as much consistency as possible between two sets of donors/sources, but with one small change. In piloting this approach with bilaterals, we found that the scenario "element is present, but not implemented" never occurred in practice. Instead, we use the score of 1 to represent a more frequently occurring scenario in which the element is not present but the donor merits some additional credit, for example due to reforms currently underway to introduce the element in future.